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INTRoDucnoN 
Regulations with important public purposes sometimes take 
away the value of a citizen's property no less completely than if the 
government had physically confiscated it. The United States 
Supreme Court has often wrestled with, but never subdued, the 
question of how far a regulation has to go before it becomes a tak­
ing of property sufficient enough to require just compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.1 
• J.D.; Reference Librarian, New York Law School Library, N.Y., N.Y. 
I would like to thank Professors Richard B. Bernstein, Linda Keenan, William P. 
LaPiana, and David S. Schoenbrod for their encouragement and helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. I am grateful to the Cooperative Services Department of New York Pub­
lic's Main Research library, New York Law School Library and its staff, and especially 
to the Fall River Public Library and Deborah Collins at the Fall River Historical Soci­
ety, whose assistance made this research possible. 
1. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa­
tion." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evan­
gelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987); Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 483 (1987). 
For a sampling of the extensive literature on takings law, see, e.g., RICHARD Ep· 
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The Court most recently addressed the problem in Lucas v.' South 
Carolina Coastal Council,2 and the case has generated a mass of 
controversy and scholarly attention.3 
Whether a regulation is construed as a taking or as a legitimate 
exercise of. police power determines the critical issues ,of whether 
compensation is awarded, for what amount, and for what period of 
time.4 Considerations include whether the taking was total or par­
tial, its purpose,5andto what extent, if at all, the owner's use of his 
property infringed upon the health or rights of others. The judicial 
test is notoriously, if understandably, obscure.6 
As recently as 1922, it was generally assumed that "the Takings 
Clause reached only a 'direct appropriation' of property or the 
functional equivalent of a 'practical ouster of [the owner's] posses­
sion."'7 In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,s the state had enacted a 
STEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF' EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977); MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); Joseph L. 
Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Frank I. 
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967)'; Joseph L. Sax, Takings and 
the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964). . 
2. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
3. See, e,g., Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tan­
gled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993); Richard Miniter, The Shifting 
Ground of Property Rights, 9 INSIGHT Aug. ,23; 1993, at 4, 9-10. 
A LEXIS search in the spring of 1994 turned up 117 law review articles on the 
Lucas case. Most of the commentary concentrates on the legal issues; I am presently 
researching the case from its (more interesting) factual perspective. 
4. See First English, 482 U.S. 304. On remand .from the Supreme Court, the 
plaintiffs in Lucas did not receive damages because the temporary taking of the use of 
their property was not considered total. Telephone Interview with Bachman Smith III, 
Esq., Counsel for South Carolina Coastal Commission (April 4, 1994). 
5. The legal definition of "public purpose" is not clear. See, e.g., Poletown Neigh­
borhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1981) (determining 
public purpose is a legislative function). 
6. One work has labelled this elusive distinction "the most haunting jurispruden­
tial problem in the field of contemporary land-use law ... one that may be the lawyer's 
equivalent of the physicist's hunt for the quark." CHARLES M. HAAR & MICHAEL A. 
WOLF, LAND-USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE, AND RE-USE OF 
URBAN LAND 875 (4th ed. 1989). See also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 
U.S. 825, 853, 866 (1987) (Steven.s, J., dissenting) ("Even the wisest lawyers would have 
to acknowledge great uncertainty about the scope of this Court's takings jurispru­
dence."); Daniel R. Mandelker & Michael M. Berger, A Plea to Allow the Federal 
Courts to Clarify the Law of Regulatory Takings, 42 LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIG. 3 
(1990) ("It is something of an open secret that the Supreme Court has yet to firmly 
define the boundaries of regulatory taking jurisprudence."). 
7., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892 (1992) (citations 
omitted) (alteration in original). 
8. 260 U.S, 393 (1922). 
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statute, the Kohler Act, that prohibited coal mining when the min­
ing caused land· which the mining company did not own to collapse, 
even when it had purchased the right to undermine the property.9 
The plaintiff's house was in danger because of the mining com­
pany's activities, but the plaintiff had purchased the property with 
knowledge of a prior deed that had granted the company the right 
to undermine the property. To give the plaintiff the benefit of the 
statute would force the coal company to leave coal in the ground it 
could otherwise have mined. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
found for the coal company, stating that, 
while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking . .. '. We are in danger 
of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public 
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a 
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the 
change.to 
Holmes would not grant the plaintiff, through the operation of a 
statute, greater rights than he had bargained for and purchased. l1 
Justice Louis D. Brandeis was the only dissenter in Mahon. 
9. See the Brief for Defendants in Error at 6-8, Mahon Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393 (1922) (No. 549) and the Brief ex rei City of Scranton at 2-5, Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 
for descriptions of the effects of subsidence. 
10. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415-16 (emphasis added). The decision was not popular 
with Holmes', colleagues. G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER 'WENDELL HOLMES: 
LAW AND THE INNER SELF 401-03 (1993). 
In Mugler v. Kansas, the Court had held that a restriction on the use of property 
that the legislature deemed detrimental to the public health, morals, or safety could not 
be considered a taking of property necessitating compensation to the owner. 123 U.S. 
623,669 (1887). Holmes called the reasoning in such cases "pretty fishy." 1 HOLMES­
LASKI LETTERS 473 (M. Howe ed. 1953) (cited in E.F. Roberts, Mining with Mr. Justice 
Holmes, 39 VAND. L. REv. 287, 292 n.27 (1987». 
As the Court said in Lucas, compensable cases will now be found where a regula­
tion denies "all economically productive or beneficial uses of land," but the point at 
which to draw the line remains a problem. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. As Justice Scalia 
admits: 
It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will get 
nothing, while the landowner with total loss will recover in full. But that occa­
sional result is no more strange than the gross disparity between the land­
owner whose premises are taken fora highway (who recovers in full) and the 
landowner whose property is reduced to 5% of its former value by the high­
way (who recovers nothing). . 
[d. at 2895 n.8. But see Epstein, supra note 3, at 1376 (calling the second example 
"merely a form of competition against which no landowner is ever entitled to compen­
sation"). Professor Epstein goes on to ask, now that the Court has announced that a 
100% deprivation of value requires compensation, "what legislature will be foolish 
enough to take an entire plot of land?" [d. at 1377. 
11. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 416. 
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While he acknowledged that any exercise of the police power re­
garding the use of property inevitably restricts its owners without 
compensating them, he believed that "restriction imposed to pro­
tect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is 
not a taking .... The State merely prevents the owner from making 
a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. "12 
Takings jurisprudence has recently been in an even 'greater 
than usual flux. In 1987, the Court decided Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,13 in which, although the facts were sim­
ilar to those of Mahon, the Court held that the earlier case did not 
control,14 In Keystone, the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land 
Conservation Act, and regulations promulgated under it, required 
that fifty percent of the coal beneath certain protected structures be 
left in the ground to support the surface.1S Coal companies sued to 
enjoin the Department of Environmental Resources from enforcing 
the Act and its regulations on the grounds that they effected a tak­
ing of property (twenty-seven million tons of coal, or about two 
percent of their total reserves) and interfered with the contractual 
waivers of liability that the companies had negotiated with surface 
owners,16 The Court ignored Pennsylvania's distinction between 
surface, mineral, and support estates, upheld the statute, and found 
no taking,17 The Court, reminiscent of Brandeis' dissent in Mahon, 
deferred to, the legislative judgment, that any interference with the 
"investment-backed expectations" of the petitioners was necessary 
to achieve the public purpose of the statute,18 which was to prevent 
a "significant threat to the common welfare. "19 
The juxtaposition of these two cases shows the changing expec­
tations and different regulatory atmospheres of the periods in which 
they were decided. Dissenting in Keystone, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
12. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Brandeis also said the opinion was the 
result of Holmes' "class bias." WHITE, supra note 10, at 555 n.124 (quoting Melvin I. 
Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. Cr. REv. 299, 321). 
13. 480 U.S. 470,481-502 (1987). 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 477. 
16. Id. at 478-79. 
17. Id. at 480-81. 
18. Id. at 505-06. 
19. Id. at 485. Holmes had found the Kohler Act to be a "private benefit" stat­
ute, partly because it usually did not apply when the surface and the coal were, owned 
by the same party; thus its "public purpose" did not justify the destruCtion of constitu­
tionally protected rights: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-14 (1922). 
No such limitation was found in the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conserva­
tion Act. 
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pointed out that the statutes at issue in each case were "strikingly 
similar"; he would have followed Mahon and found a taking.20 He 
considered the value of the fraction of petitioner's coal deposits 
which had been destroyed by the statutory requirement,21 whereas 
the majority compared the value of the petitioner's entire holdings 
to the relatively small percentage at issue.22 The Chief Justice be­
lieved ,that petitioners had been deprived of all use of a segment of 
their property as effectively as if it had been physically appropri­
ated.23 It is perhaps no coincidence that Keystone and two other 
leading United States Supreme Court takings c,ases24 occurred dur­
ing the recession of the late 1980s, when public desire for regulation 
collided with public reluctance to finance such regulation with tax 
dollars. 
In Mahon, two old friends, Holmes and Brandeis, uncharacter­
istically disagreed.25 Thirty years earlier, however, they had ulti­
mately agreed with each other on a conceptually similar issue. The 
Watuppa Ponds cases had presented such a problem, eventually 
known as a "regulatory taking," in the context of water power, 
which immediately preceded coal as the primary power source in 
the East. Brandeis and his first law partner, Samuel D. Warren, Jr., 
had joined forces to fight a proposed state statute that would have 
extended the holding of the second Watuppa case. They believed 
the statute would take the property of mill owners on the river that 
exited the ponds by decreasing its volume. Their efforts may have 
persuaded Holmes, then of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court, to hold in the final case that the mills should be compen­
sated for their losses. The pivotal evidence was a deed, as it would 
be later in Mahon. Although, ancient and previously unknown to 
the plaintiffs, it proved sufficient to support their claims. Legal sta­
20. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 507, 508-13 (Rehnquist C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist was joined by Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia. 
21. [d. at 514. 
22. [d. at 476-77. 
23. [d. at 517-18. The tension between the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Keystone resurfaced in the South Carolina Supreme Court opinion in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.c. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) 
("Lucas' position and the position of our dissenting brothers, is the position of the dis­
sent in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis (citation omitted), while the 
Coastal Council's view is represented by the Keystone majority .... [W]e choose to 
follow the majority view rather than the dissent in Keystone."). 
24. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Ev­
angelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
25. ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 570-71 (1946). 
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bility eventually prevailed, despite the economic turmoil of the re­
gion and per!0d. . 
The tale of the Watuppa Pond cases and related events is worth 
narrating, not only because it is a good yarn, but also for the insight 
it sheds on Holmes and Brandeis and on the development of doc­
trine that remains in dispute to this day. This Article is its first full 
telling. 
I. THE WATUPPA PONDS CASES 
The Quequechan (pronounced "quick-e-shan"), or Fall River, 
originated in North and South Watuppa Ponds, which were con­
nected by a narrow passageway and covered about 3300acres.26 
After two miles, the river emptied into tide waters; during its last 
half mile it fell 130 feet, and it was there the original mills were 
located.27 In 1889, the city of Fall River depended entirely on the 
prosperity of its 57 cotton mills, which operated 43,875 looms and 
2,000,00D spindles (one-seventh of the total in the entire country), 
produced about 500,000,000 yards of cloth a year, and employed a 
total of 20,000 people with a weekly payroll of about $125,000; their 
invested capital amounted to $20,000,000.28 Fall. River had many 
advantages as an industrial city, and had become the leading textile 
manufacturing center in the country by 1875.29 
In 1871, the Massachusetts legislature authorized Fall River to 
appropriate water from North Watuppa Pond for domestic pur­
poses and explicitly made the city liable if a resulting diminution in 
water power affected the mills adversely.30 Prior to -1886, 222 acts 
26. Samuel D. Warren, Jr. & Louis D. Brandeis, The Watuppa Pond Cases, 2 
HARV. L. REv. 195, 195-96 (1888). 
27. Id. at 196; see also 1 LoUIS C. HUNTER, A HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL POWER 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1930, at 533 (1979). 
28. Silent Looms. Fall River Weavers Begin the Battle, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, 
Mar. 12, 1889, at 1, (morning ed.); Weavers Wearing Green. Fall River Strike Hides Its 
Diminished Head During Feast Day of St. Patrick, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 18, 
1889, at 1 (evening ed.). 
The 1888 dollar was worth approximately $42.65 in 1989 dollars. The figure is de­
rived from THE VALUE OF A DOLLAR: PRICES AND INCOMES IN THE UNITED STATES 
1860-1989, at 2 (Scott Derks ed., 1994). The weekly payroll would thus be equivalent to 
$5,331,250 in 1989, and the invested capital an impressive $853,000,000. 
. 29. THOMAS R. SMITH, THE COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY OF FALL RIVER, MAS­
SACHUSETTS 40 (1944). 
30. The statute read: 
[T]he city of Fall River shall be liable to pay all damages that shall be sus­
tained by any person or persons in their property by the taking respectively of 
the entire waters of said North Watuppa Pond, or by the taking of any less 
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of this kind similarly provided for compensation to mill owners in 
Massachusetts, consistent with the common law's treatment of ripa-: 
rian owners' rights to a flow of water.31 In 1873, the city accord­
ingly passed a bill taking 1,500,000 gallons of water per day from 
the Watuppa Ponds.32 
The Watuppa Ponds, however, were not ordinary ponds. They 
were "great ponds," as were many bodies of water affected by the 
appropriation acts.33 
II. WHAT Is A "GREAT POND?" 
The colonists of Massachusetts Bay Colqny considered its 
many, large, freshwater ponds and lakes too vital to the commu­
nity's survival to permit them to be privately owned.34 Horace 
Gray, Jr., in Commonwealth v. City of Roxbury ,35 noted that while 
the colonists were eager to enact a body of laws, they did not want 
to be perceived as overstepping the command in their charter to 
"make no laws repugnant to the laws of England."36 Their first 
proportion of said waters, as authorized by the second and third sections of 
this act, or by the taking of any land, rights of way, water rights or easements. 
St. of 1871, c. 133, § 10,cited in Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River ("Watuppa /"), 134 
Mass. 267, 268 (1883). 
31. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 195, 199. The common law of water­
courses evolved prior to the nineteenth century industrial expansion, and was founded 
upon the maxim, aqua currit et debet currere, ut currere solebat; that is, water flows, and 
should flow, as 'it is accustomed to flow. Every owner of property through which water 
passed was entitled to its use. Similar to the concept of prescription, this rule was modi­
fied to avoid an inevitable anti-development effect as the demand for water power in­
creased. THEODORE STEINBERG, NATURE INCORPORATED: INDUSTRIALIZATION AND 
niE WATERS OF NEW ENGLAND 140-48 (1991). 
32. 	 Watuppa /,134 Mass. at 268. 
33. 	 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 195. 
34. Slater v. Gunn, 49 N.E. 1017, 1020 (Mass. 1898); West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 
89 Mass. (7 Allen) 158, 167 (1863). 
35. 75 Mass. (9 Gray) 451, 503-28 (1857) (editor Horace Gray, Jr., reporting in a 
note following the decision). 
Gray was Reporter of Decisions for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
from 1854 to 1860. He served as Associate and then Chief Justice from 1864 to 1882. In 
'1879, in the first year of his partnership with Samuel Warren, Louis Brandeis became 
Chief Justice Gray's law clerk. STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF LAWS AND LIMITA­
TIONS: AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT OF LoUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS 75-76 (1994). 
Gray joined the United States Supreme Court in 1882; in 1902, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr. took his place. See Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 
356,360 n.3 (Mass. 1979). 
36. 	 Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) at 513; see also Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 
(7 Cush.) 53,71 (1851) (Shaw, C.J.): 	. 

It might seem to them less aITogant to set forth and declare their 'liberties' and 

rights in this form, than to enact in terms a body of laws, which might seem to 
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code, the "Body of Liberties," ("colony ordinance" or "ordinance") 
was published in manuscript form in 1641 and amended annually 
until 1648.37 
Section two of the colony ordinance read as follows: 
"Every inhabitant who is a householder, shall have free fishing 
and fowling in any great ponds, bays, coves[,] and rivers, so far as 
the sea ebbes and flows within the precincts of the town where 
they dwell, unless the freemen of the same town or the general 
court have otherwise appropriated them. 
Provided, that no town shall appropriate to any particular 
person or persons, any great pond, containing more than ten acres 
of land, and that no man shall come upon another's propriety 
without their [sic] leave, otherwise than as hereafter expressed. 
And for great ponds lying in common, though within the 
bounds ofsome town, it shall be free for any man to fish and fowle 
there, and may pass and repass on foot thrc;mgh any man's propri­
ety for that end, so they [sic] trespass not upon any man's corn or 
meadow."38 
indicate a disregard of the authority of the mother country. This use of the 
term 'liberty,' as synonymous with right, franchise, and privilege, is strictly 
conformable to the sense of the term as used in Magna Charta . . .. . 
Id. See also Stoddard, 81J; Mass. (7 Allen) at 166 (discussing the colonists' desire to 
make a code of written laws without "express legislation, in order to avoid any direct 
antagonism with the government in England"). . 
37. Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) at 513. Many cases express confiision over the 
exact date. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 18 (1893). See also Mark Cheung, Re­
thinking the History ofthe Seventeenth-Century Colonial Ordinance: A Reinterpretation 
of an Ancient Statute, 42 ME. L. REV. 115, 138-42 (1990). 
According to Storer v. Freeman, 6 Mass. 435, 438 (1810), the ordinance was "an­
nulled with the charter by the authority of which it was made" in 1684, id., but Gray 
says that the judgment against the charter was denied by the House of Commons, and 
was never admitted here. Roxbury, 75 Mass. (9 Gray) at 517. 
38, Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 197 (quoting Colonial Laws of Massa­
chusetts 90). Gray suggested that the colony ordinance really (;>nly defined what ~as at 
the time common usage, as a result of the exigencies of colonial life. Roxbury, 75 Mass. 
(9 Gray) at 514-17. The contemporary version of the ordinance is codified at MASS. 
GEN. L. ch. 131, § 45 (1992). 
Note that the ordinance operated prospectively only and explicitly excluded ponds' 
that had been granted into private hands prior to its enactment. Apparently, however; 
few such conveyances were made. The second Watuppa Pond opinion said only one 
was known and that it h~d been upheld as creating good title in the grantee. This con­
veyance was made in 1635 to John Humfry, and consisted of "500 acres of land & a 
freshe pond, with a little ileland conteyneing aboute two acres." Watuppa Reservoir 
Co. v. City of Fall River ("Watuppa II"), 18 N.E. 465, 470 (Mass. 1888); see also Stod­
dard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) at 165 (citation omitted). Wiswell's Pond in "Newtown" was 
the only other example I foup.d. See Stoneham v. Commonwealth, 144 N.E. 83, 84 
(Mass. 1924). 
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This provision concerning public ownership of, access to, and 
use of ponds over' a certain size secured an important right, as 
shown by its inclusion in the same chapter that dealt with freedom 
of speech in courts and town meetings and the freedom of emigra­
tion.39 Its broad purpose, dear to the hearts of the colonists, was to 
"declare a great principle of public right, to abolish the forest laws, 
the game laws, and the Jaws designed to secure several and exclu­
sive fisheries, and to make them all free. "40 
On its face, the ordinance appeared to authorize a trespass to 
the land surrounding a great pond if the property were not actually 
damaged. This limitation on property ownership was understanda­
ble given the primitive conditions under which the ordinance was 
enacted. Inevitably, however, as the Commonwealth became more 
densely populated, the ostensible easement that this created was 
severely narrowed by the courts. In 1863, the question arose for the 
first time 'whether the uses specified in the ordinance (fishing and 
fowling) were exclusive; the court interpreted the public reservation 
to be flexible enough to include additional uses.41 Later cases, how-: 
ever, held that the ordinance was only "intended to limit the pass: 
ing and repassing to unimproved and uninclosed [ sic] lands lying on 
the ponds, and [was] to be construed with reference to the condi­
tion of things existing when the ordinance was adopted. "42 The dis­
tribution of competing rights among individuals, state and local 
governments, and businesses, some of which had rights granted by 
the legislature, became increasingly more complex. As cities and 
towns proliferated in Massachusetts, the public's need for fresh 
water and the mills' need for power came into direct conflict. 
III. WATUPPA I 
The Watuppa Reservoir Company was incorporated in 1826 to 
construct a dam that would raise the water in the ponds to a certain 
height and to maintain a reservoir for the benefit of the company's 
39. See Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) at 168; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 
197. 
40. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 68 (1851) (Shaw, c.J.). 
41. Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) at 167. The court stated: 

With the growth of the community, and its progress in the arts, these public 

reservations, at first set apart with reference to certain special uses only, be­

come capable of many others which are within the design and intent of the 

original appropriation. The devotion to public use is sufficiently broad to in­

clude them all, as they arose. 

[d.; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 205-06. 
42. Slater v. Gunn, 49 N.E. 1017,J019-20 (Mass. 1898). 
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stockholders, the mill-owners on the river.43 In 1883, the company 
and eight mills sued for damages from Fall River's 1873 appropria­
tion of water and the resulting diminution in their water power.44 
The city argued that the state owned the great ponds and the land 
under them and that riparian owners on the Quequechan had no 
right to the flow of water, contrary to their rights at common law.45 
The superior court disagreed and the supreme judicial court af­
firmed; the 1871 statute had explicitly provided damages for injury 
to water rights and the city was required to compensate the mills. 
Furthermore, even the lowest mill on the stream, the American 
Print Works, which used the water only for bleaching and cleansing 
processes and not for power, was also entitled to damages.46 
Various local papers reflected the anger which the decision 
aroused. The Fall River Daily Herald stated, "[t]his decision is con­
trary to reason, though it may be quite in harmony with the law, 
and it only shows how widely separated these two things sometimes 
become."47 The Fall River Daily Evening News announced that 
damages would amount to $76,780.95.48 The next day it claimed 
43. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River ("Watuppa l"), 134 Mass. 267, 269-70 
(1883) (citing St. of 1826, ch. 31). 
44. Id.; The Water Suits. Decided Finally Against the City, FALL RIVER DAILY 
EVENING NEws, Mar. 1, 1883, ai 2. . 
Ten years may seem like a long time between the city's order and the suit, but the 
controversy had been brewing for some time. See WILLIAM ROTCH, REpORT ON THE 
CASE OF THE WATUPPA RESERVOIR CO. VS. THE CITY OF FALL RIVER (1880) (civil 
engineering report on the computation of damages sustained by the city's taking of 
water). 
45. See infra part V-B. 
46. Watuppa I, 134 Mass. at 270-71. Massachusetts in general, and Fall River in 
particular, led the country in production of printed cloth, so possibly this mill was essen­
tial to the others. See SMITH, supra note 29, at 86. 
In 1881, Thomas Stetson, counsel for the city, argued forcefully that manufacturing 
establishments which did not use water for power should not be able to recover any 
damages. He reasoned that in 1825, when the reservoir company was incorporated, 
none of the mills on the river had any other use for the water, as there was no steam 
power in Fall River until 1838. Argument of Mr. Stetson 23-24 (Apr. 16, 1881). The 
legislation that had protected Massachusetts mills since colonial days, see infra note 96, 
had not contemplated using the water for steam, dyeing, bleaching or cleansing, but 
only for driving a mill by a head of water. [d. at 23-25. In this peripheral issue, only 
mentioned in passing in the dissent to the second opinion, Watuppa Reservoir v. City of 
Fall River, 18 N.E. 465, 475, 478 (Mass. 1888) (Knowlton, J., dissenting), we see the 
tension between ancient law and contemporary reality. 
47. The Water Suits Decision, FALL RIVER DAILY HERALD, Mar. 2, 1883, at 2. 
48. The Water Suits. Decided Finally Against the City, supra note 44. Another 
article says that an additional annual charge of up to $25,000 was possible. The Water 
Suits Decision, supra note 47. In the briefs preceding the second suit, Stetson claimed 
the amount paid was actually about $70,000. Hearings on Petition for an Act Granting 
the City of Fall River Water from a Great Pond, Legis. Comm. upon Water Supply, 3, 5 
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that the 1871 statute, the basis for the award to the mills, had been 
drafted by a Judge Thomas, "learned counsel" for the company.49 
Further, "shrewdness on one side [the city's lawyers], and public 
spirit on the other [the mills] were wanting, and the city will be 
under the galling necessity of paying in perpetuity for that as a priv­
ilege which they ought to enjoy as a right."50 The article noted that 
water power, as a source of energy, "was growing less valuable as 
compared with steam year by year."51 . 
In fact, Fall River had not become the major textile producer 
in the country by remaining as it had begun, dependant upon the 
falls of the Quequechan. The first mill had been built on the river 
in 1813,52 but by 1850 the water power had been developed to the 
fullest possible extent. Conveniently, at about the same time, 
George Corliss' improvements in steam-powered engines made 
them adaptable to textile mills.53 By 1860, Fall River's first three 
steam powered mills had almost one quarter of the total number of 
spindles in the city; by 1875, the city's eleven water wheels pro­
duced only a fracti()n of the horsepower of its eighty-one steam en­
gines.54 Mills constructed in the last half of the century were no' 
longer tied to the falls for power, but could obtain sufficient water 
from wells or canals and could be located anywhere.55 By 1883, all 
the water-powered mills were provided with auxiliary steam power, 
because. the river was an unreliable source of power in the sum­
mer.56 By the late 1880s, steam was the primary source of power.57 
(May 18, 1886) (argument of Thomas M. Stetson, petitioner) [hereinafter Argument of 
Thomas M. Stetson). The company asserted that the sum paid was considerably less, 
$50,792.25. See Brief for Watuppa Reservoir Company at 24, Petition of the City of Fall 
River for an Amendment to its Water Act 1871 Ch.133, (1886) [hereinafter Petition]. 
In contemporary dollars, damages would have ranged between $2,166,278 and 
$2,985,500. See supra note 28. 
49. The Water Suits, supra note 44. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Nuisances in Quequechan River. Hearing by the Committee on Health, FALL 
RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Mar. 1, 1883, at 1. 
53. SMITH, supra note 29, at 45. The last two water-powered mills were built in 
1846 and 1848. Id. at 46. 
54. Id. at 47. 
55. Id. at 71-79 and map at 73, showing the pattern of mill construction. 
56. ROTCH, supra note 44, at 5; Nuisances in Quequechan River. Hearing by the 
Committee on Health, supra note 52. 
As early as 1836, several Fall River mills had steam power available for use during 
droughts. 1 HUNTER, supra note 27, at 514. By 1880, "auxiliary steam power was 
widely adopted in the principal river basins east of the Mississippi." Id. at 515. 
57. SMITH, supra note 29, at 40. 
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IV. THE "WATUPPA NUISANCE" CASE 

At the time of the first water suit, the Watuppa Reservoir 
Company was embroiled in another controversy. When the water 
in the ponds was low, the shore (or "flats") of the half~mile long 
channel between the ponds and the company's dam became a 
"'wet, rotten [and] spongy'" swamp.58 The resulting stenc~ from 
sewage dumped there. by the mills and the city was offensive half a 
mile away. It was considered at least detrimental to the public. 
health, if not the actual source of scarlet fever, typhoid fever, and 
diphtheria, and the cause of several deaths.59 The Board of Health 
believed that the only way to abate the nuisance was to fill in the 
flats. The company relied on its fight to flood the flats and vehe­
mently disagreed, since filling would narrow the channel and de­
plete the flow of water to the mills. It claimed that the abutting 
property owners were merely trying to confiscate its property, arid 
that it was entitled to compensation.60 After all, the company as­
serted, it had not created the nuisance; the mills and the city had.61 
In 1877, Colin Mackenzie, an owner of property on the flats, 
began filling the swamp and continued after the company ordered 
him to stop. Two years later, the company sought an injunction, but 
the Board of Health ordered Mackenzie, twice, to continue. The 
company sued to restrain him, and won, despite the admission of its 
lawyer, James M. Morton, that the land was not necessary to it.62 
The opinion ignored the legislature's right to condemn property 
under its police power; it construed the company's charter in its 
favor and the Board of Health's oroers to be "simply void."63 .The 
58. Nuisances in Quequechan River. Hearing by the Committee on Health, supra 
note 52 (citation omitted). . 
59. Id.; see also The Watuppa Pond Nuisance, FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Mar. 15, 
1883, at 2. For twenty years, ending in 1876, the Hargraves soap works had boiled de.ad 
cows and horses and poured its refuse into the stream and the ponds. The Watuppa 
Flats. Hearing for the Abatement of the Nuisance, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, 
Mar. 8, 1883, at 1. The sewer system had not extended to the part of the city affected. 
Nuisances in Quequechan River. Hearing by the Committee on Health, supra note 52. 
60. Nuisances in Quequechan River. Hearing by the Committee on Health, supra 
note 52. The company suggested $500,000 as appropriate compensation. The Watuppa 
Nuisance, FALL RIVER DAILY HERALD, Mar. 8, 1883, at 4. . 
61. The Watuppa Flats. Hearing for the Abatement ofthe Nuisance, supra note 59. 
62. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Mackenzie, 132 Mass. 71 (1882). See also Nui­
sances in Quequechan River. Hearing by the Committee on Health, supra note 52. Mor­
ton also argued for the company in Watuppa I, see supra part III, which he cited as 
supportive of the company's rights here. The Watuppa Flats. Hearing for the Abatemimt 
of the Nuisance, supra note 59. 
63. Mackenzie, 132 Mass. at 73-74. 
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case was then referred to a Master to determine damages from the 
filling done before the injunction.64 
The Board of Health, "thus thwarted in their efforts, found 
themselves helpless in an emergency demanding instant action" and 
applied to the legislature.65 Hearings followed, debating: (1) what, 
if anything, should be done, (2) how the financial burden should be 
allocated for both compensation to the cqmpany (if granted) and 
the cqst of filling, and (3) the language of.a proposed bill to ensure 
the abatement of the nuisance.66 All parties agreed that the nui­
sance existed, but the city, after WatujJpa I, was loath to pay com­
pensation to the company again.67 Although. the company claimed 
that its rights of flowage were equivalent to. ownership of the land, 
it denied either responsibility or liability.68 Each party accused the 
others of personal interest in the outcome and hotly contested 
which group-commissioners appointed by the State Board of 
Health, the City Council,69 or the Board of Aldermen-was best 
qualified to abate the nuisance.70 Although the members of the 
legislative committee who participated in the hearings were sympa­
64. The Watuppa Nuisance, FALL RIvER WKLY. NEWS, Mar. 15, 1883, at 2. 
65. Id. The papers were furious at th~ whole affair. An irllte article, published 
after the court's decision in Watuppa I, said: 
Taking the establishment ofthis claim [in the water case] in· connection with 
the monstrous assumption of the Watuppa Reservoir Company to levy black­
mail on the owners of the land along the river, and to prevent the filling in of 
the land to the great inconvenience and danger of the whole popUlation of the 
city, it becomes a question whether the people of Fall River have any rights 
which these corporate tyrants are bound to respect. 
The Water Suits Decision, supra note 47. 
66. Hearings were reported in detail in: Nuisances in Quequechan River. Hear­
ing by the Committee on Health, supra note 52; The Watuppa Flats. Hearing for the 
Abatement of the Nuisance, supra note 59; The Watuppa Flats Nuisance ..Hearing on the 
Proposed Legislative Act, FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Mar. 22, 1883, at 2; The Watuppa 
Flats Nuisance. Hearing in Boston Yesterday, FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Apr. 12, 1883, 
at 2. 
67. The Watuppa Flats Nuisance. Hearing on the Proposed Legislative Act, supra 
note 66. Mayor Braley stated: 
We are mulcted first for damages to pay for water in the ponds and then for 
damages in this nuisance case and if we cannot get relief without paying for it, 
we prefer to let it go .... Do they [the company] ~ot hold this right of flowage 
subject to the police power of the Commonwealth and the demands of public 
good? 
Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. The Watuppa Flats Bill, FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Apr. 5, 1883 at 2. See also 
The Claims of the Reservoir Co., FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Apr. 12, 1883, at 2. 
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thetic to the city,71 the bill, as finally passed, was "framed in the 
interest of the Watuppa Reservoir Company rather than in that of 
the city, and grant[ed] more to the company than they [had] asked 
for."72 
The right conveyed in the company's charter to flood the flats 
did not include the option to ignore a public nuisance. The state, 
possibly subjected. to pressure. from powerful mill interests, ap­
peared to have eluded its responsibility to protect the public health. 
As the company claimed the prerogatives of ownership, it should 
have been held responsible, as any private owner traditionally 
would have been, to abate a nuisance on its property. Possibly this 
controversy contributed to the firm stance the court took against 
the mills five years later. 
v. WATllPPA 1/ 
In March 1883, shortly after Watuppa I was decided, the Fall 
River Daily Herald reported that the Board of Aldermen had au­
thorized the mayor to "petition the legislature for such an act or 
acts as may be necessary to secure the rights of the city under all 
future condemnations of water in the Watuppa ponds for city and 
public purposes."73 Three years later, the city successfully proposed 
that the legislature amend the 1871 act to allow the city to draw an 
additional 1,500,000 gallons daily.74 The amendment, in response to 
Watuppa I, included a provision specifically denying the city's liabil­
ity for damages other than those· "the state itself would be legally 
71. The Watuppa Flats Bill, supra note 70. 
72. The Watuppa Flats, FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Apr. 19,1883, at 1. The bill, as 
reported on the same page and approved the following June 16, provided that expenses 
and damages would be paid out of the city treasury, with reimbursement through collec­
tion of taxes. The city, however, had never been able to collect any taxes from the 
reservoir company. The Watuppa Flats Nuisance. Hearing in Boston Yesterday, FALL 
RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Apr. 12, 1883, at 2. As an article on April 19 stated, "[w]e see in 
this bill a certain and extravagant expenditure of the public money with a very uncer­
tain return of any portion of it." The Watuppa Flats, supra. 
73. City Government. An Additional Appropriation of $25,000 Made to Meet the 
Judgment in the Water Suits, FALL RIVER DAILY HERALD, Mar. 6, 1883, at 1. 
74. Argument of Thomas M. Stetson, Before the Legislative Committee upon 
Water Supply. In Behalf of the City of Fall River, Petitioner for an Act Granting it 
Water From a Great Pond (May 18, 1886). Stetson alleged that thirty-two million gal­
lons of water flowed from the ponds every day. Id. at 5. Not surprisingly, counsel for 
the mills estimated the flow somewhat lower, at twenty-five million gallons. Brief for 
Watuppa Reservoir Company and the Mills Constituting It at 10, Petition, supra note 
48. 
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liable to pay."75 The amendment continued: "Parties holding, in 
respect of said pond, any privileges or grants heretofore made, and 
liable to revocation or alteration by the state, shall have no claim 
against said city in respect of water drawn under this grant. "76 The 
amendment annulled "any privileges heretofore enjoyed in respect 
of said pond," if inconsistent with the amended act.77 Governor 
Robinson refused to sign the bill, on the grounds that the amend­
ment authorized the taking of private property without providing 
compensation, but it was passed over his veto.78 
Again, the Watuppa Reservoir Company and the Troy Cotton 
and Woolen Manufactory sued for an injunction to prevent the city 
from diminishing their water power.79 The question presented was 
whether the legislature could constitutionally authorize a city to ap­
propriate the waters of a great pond for public purposes without 
compensating owners of land or privileges on a stream flowing from 
it.80 
In the arguments before the Legislative Committee on Water 
Supply, the exchange of briefs that preceded the second case, and 
the opinion itself, the defendant city relied upon the colony ordi­
nance and case law which supported its devotion of the ponds to 
public use and argued that the legislature's power to regulate public 
rights was unlimited.81 Its counsel, Thomas Stetson, distinguished 
75. 1886 Act, ch. 353, § 1, quoted in Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River 
("Watuppa II"), 18 N.E. 465, 469 (Mass. 1888). 
76. 1886 Act, ch. 353, § 1, quoted in Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 469. 
77. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 196. 
78. [d. The governor also "felt that the act was an innovation and violation of 
well established precedents." The Water Suits, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, 
Oct. 30, 1888, at 2. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
79. Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 469; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 196. 
80. Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 470. 
81. Argument of Thomas M. Stetson supra note 48, at 3, 5, 27-29; Watuppa II, 18 
N.E. at 466. 
A leading case the city relied upon was West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 
Allen) 158 (1863). See supra part I. Stetson pointed out that the judge who wrote that 
opinion, E. Rockwood Hoar, was now counsel for the company. 
You know, gentlemen, that a member even of my profession, when paid by a 
client, for a purpose, employed to contend for his claims and to argue for him, 
does not always announce the law quite so safely and soundly as he would do 
if holding the commission of the Commonwealth and sitting upon her Judicial 
Bench. I propose, first therefore, to appeal from my brother Hoar arguendo 
to Mr. Justice Hoar judicando, and to refer to that grand fortress of popular 
right in these Great Pond subjects-the case of West Roxbury vs. Stoddard 
.... He told you modestly that he had something to do with that case. Mod­
esty has kept many a man from preferment. It shall be my office to see to it 
that my friend's modesty shall not lose him now the well-earned fame to which 
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between a direct invasion or appropriation of private property, 
which would constitute a taking, and a consequential injury to pri­
vate property that might result from legislative control of public 
rights, which would not.82 Stetson emphasized that water was then 
of secondary importance to steam.83 He claimed that every one of 
the mills had "long since outgrown its waterpower, and ha[d] to 
maintain two separate power plants. In fact about all the value left 
it is to use it for a claim of damages whenever the public needs the 
State's water."84 The mills and reservoir company had taken their 
grants subject to the public rights in great ponds, and compensation 
to them was not required.85 
The plaintiff company claimed that no case had ever held that 
the waters of a great pond could be diverted by the state or anyone 
to the detriment of a riparian proprietor on an outlet stream.86 Its 
lawyers sought to show that the ponds were part of a natural, con­
stantly flowing watercourse, and therefore not governed by the or­
dinance, but by the common law;87 thus, the state could not be 
that cause entitles him. Do you know, gentlemen, he wrote it himself .... A 
man may not disclaim his debts, nor will we allow Judge Hoar to disclaim the 
fame and honor of such a decision .... Nobody ever could drive a horse-cart 
through one of Mr. Justice Hoar's decisions. 
Argument of Thomas M. Stetson, supra note 48, at 7-8. At least in this opinion, nobody 
did. 
82. Argument of Thomas M. Stetson, supra note 48, at 7-8. This argument clearly 
anticipated the modern regulatory takings dilemma. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 28. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
85. Argument of Thomas M. Stetson, supra note 48, at 27-29; see also Watuppa II, 
18 N.E. at 466-67. 
86. Brief for Watuppa Reservoir Co. at 11-12, Petition, supra note 48. The com­
pany also accused the city of attempting to try questions that, in 1883, had already 
"been tried before commissioners, the [s]uperior court and the [s]upreme court and 
decided adversely to the city, but which the city fancies it finds some encouragment [sic] 
in the opinion of the court in 134 Mass., [sic] 267 to try over again if it can secure this 
Legislation." Id. at 23. The "encouragement" referred to may be found in the first 
Watuppa ponds case, "[i]f there may be contingencies in which it might divert the wa­
ters to the injury of persons owning water rights on the outlet without making compen­
sation, it is clear that the Legislature has not claimed or asserted any such right in this 
case." Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River ("Watuppa I"), 134 Mass. 267, 269 (1883); 
see also Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 468 (plaintiffs' counsel's argument). 
87. Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 468 (plaintiffs' counsel's argument). The company 
admitted: 
There may be great ponds with neither inlet [n]or outlet whose waters have 
not been granted by the Legislature from which the Legislature might author­
ize water to be taken without compensation to anyone. But in such a case the 
waters of the pond form no part of a watercourse. 
Brief for Watuppa Reservoir Co. at 12, Petition, supra note 48. 
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allowed to divert the water to the detriment of a lower proprietor.88 
The company's charter was a contract between it and the state that 
had vested water rights in the mills which the later legislative 
amendment could not injure.89 Further, although the company did 
not deny that public needs must be satisfied when they arose, it 
asserted that the act of 1886 was unconstitutional because it made 
no provision for compensation.90 
In a four to three decision, the court dismissed the suit.91 The 
common law would indeed have required compensation for a dimi­
nution in the flow of an ordinary stream, but the legislature was 
entitled to grant these waters without paying riparian users because 
the colony ordinance had devoted great ponds to public purposes.92 
The ordinance was "universally accepted" and in force throughout 
the entire state, even in regions that had originally not been within 
the boundary of Massachusetts Bay Colony when it was enacted.93 
No legal liability would be incurred for the deprivation because the 
company's right to the waters of the ponds, although granted to it' 
by the state, was "a qualified right, subject to the superior right of 
the state to use the pond and its waters for other public uses."94 
The legislature could also authorize cities or towns to exercise these 
powers.95 The opinion never mentioned the increasing importance 
of steam power. 
A dissent reiterated the argument that the ponds were part of a 
natural watercourse, and saw no reason to treat streams flowing 
from great ponds any differently from other streams. It maintained 
that the ordinance should not be interpreted to limit riparian pro­
prietors' right to a flow of water: 
88. Brief for Watuppa Reservoir Co. at 11, Petition, supra note 48. To this point 
the city claimed that at common law, riparian proprietors had the right only to "ordi­
nary" use of water. Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 468-69; see infra part V-B. Thus, even if the 
ponds were a part of a watercourse, the city claimed the outcome should be in its favor. 
89. Brief for Watuppa Reservoir Co. at 15-17, 20-22, Petition, supra note 48; see 
also Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 469. 
90. Brief for Watuppa Reservoir Co. at 21-22, 28, Petition, supra note 48; see also 
Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 469. 
91. Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 474. One of the majority who voted against compensa­
tion to the mills was Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. He had been an associate justice of the 
supreme judicial court since 1882, but was absent from the court when Watuppa [ was 
decided. 
92. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 196-98; Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 472. 
93. Watuppa II, 18 N.E. at 471 (listing Plymouth, Nantucket, Dukes County, and 
Maine). 
94. [d. at 472. 
95. [d. See infra parts V-A, V-B. 
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Can it be supposed that our forefathers, zealous as they were in 
the encouragement of the erection ofmills, intended by these pro­
visions to take from individuals, without compensation,. rights 
which they had acquired under previous grants to have water 
flow through their lands forever?96 . 
Furthermore, the dissent continued, the Commonwealth' had en­
tered into a contract with the company through its corporate char­
ter, and the rights it had granted in that document vested rights in 
the company that could not be taken away without compensation 
unless the charter was repealed.97 · , ' 
As a result of Watuppa II, "a hue and cry has been raised that 
the supreme court had struck a terrible blow at the manufacturing 
interests of the state."98 The day of the decision,' the Boston Daily 
Globe reported, "[i]t was claimed at the argument by plaintiff's 
counsel that if the statute was constitutional it might result in Fall 
River alone in the destruction of $3,40,000 worth of property with­
'out the payment of $1."99 The Fall River Daily Evening News and 
the Fal/River Daily Herald applauded the decisionYlO . 
96. Watuppa II, 18 N,E. at 475-77 (Knowlton, J., dissenting). The italicized lan­
guage refers to the Massachusetts Mill Acts, which froni 1713 and through many 
amendments, insulated millers from lawsuits by landowners whose property had been 
Hooded by dams. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERI­
CAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 47-52 (1977); OSCAR AND MARY F. HAND~IN, COMMON­
WEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 12­
16,71-78 (1969); STEINBERG, supra note 31, at 30-32; The Law of Water Privileges, 2 
AM. JURIST 25 (1829); JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATER­
COURSES 664-81 (6th ed. i869); 1 HUNTER, supra note 27, at 32-34. Leading mill cases 
include Fay v, Salem & Danvers Aqueduct Co., 111 Mass. 27.(1872); Paine v. Woods, 
108 Mass. 160 (1871); Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467 
(1832); Fiske v. Framingham Mfg. Co., 29 Mass. (12 Pick,) 68 (1831); Wolcott Woolen 
Mfg. Co. v. Upham, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 292 (1827); and Stowell v. Flagg, 11 Mass. 364 
(1814). 
97. Watuppa II, 18 N,E. at 479, As noted, the majority summarily dismissed the 
plaintiff's argument on this point, saying that the state had not granted away the pub­
lic's rights in the ponds by granting the corporate charter. Id. at 473. 
98. Free Water for Towns, FALL RIVER DAILY HERALD, Mar. 13, 1889, at 1. In­
terestingly, the article went on to discuss the mills' inclination to try the case again: 
There is talk of some one-sided trade between a king of the colonies and the 
Piutes whereby a title was passed, which has been overlooked. If enough im­
portance can be attached to the antique transaction, it is possible that the city 
may be put to considerable expense in the future. . 
Id. See infra § VI. 
99. Plenty of Water for All. Deemed a Wise Public Policy, BOSTON DAILY 
GLOBE, Oct. 29, 1888, at 5 (evening ed.). 
100. The Water Suits, supra note 78. The newspaper reported: 
Citizens of Fall River will receive the judgment 'of the supreme judicial court 
... with a grateful sense of relief and abiding confidence in its equity and 
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The Fall River Daily Evening News stated that Fall River was 
not the only city in the state that required water and had been dis­
couraged from taking it by manufacturing interests.10l In fact, after 
the 1886 act was passed, similar powers had been granted to other 
towns,l02 and soon legislation was proposed to codify and give gen­
eral application to the holding of the case. 
A. The Proposed Water Bill 
Shortly after Watuppa II, Representative Pratt of Abington in­
troduced a bill into the legislature to extend the effects of the ruling 
by general legislation. The Committee on Water Supply granted 
hearings to "consider the expediency of giving to towns that now or 
may hereafter take water from Great Ponds for domestic, fire and 
other purposes the same rights in the waters of said ponds as the 
Commonwealth now has."lo3 A few days later, on March 7, a Bos­
ton .Dally Globe editorial entitled Danger to Manufactures ex­
pressed its disgust for the opinion, the proposal, and its potential 
effect on industry.l04 
wisdom .... [T]he Legislature ... ha[s] only exercised the natural rights which 
belong by the supreme law of public necessity, to every government which has 
a right to protect its people. Any other decision would have been based upon 
narrow technical grounds, and could not have stood the sifting test of public 
thought and criticism. 
[d. See also Another Victory. The Wautuppa [sic] Reservoir Company Beaten in Court, 
FALL RIVER DAILY HERALD, Oct. 3D, 1888, at 1. 
101. The Water Suits, supra note 78. The article stated: 
Fall River is not alone in meeting the exorbitant claims of people who resist 
public improvements and the general welfare of the community in a spirit 
which challenges the entire body of citizenship to rebel against it. All over the 
commonwealth there are places situated as Fall River is in relation to our 
great ponds, heavily taxed as we are to maintain public improvements, who 
will hail this decision as a signal and righteous interpretation of law in the 
interest of public health and public justice. 
102. The City. Hearing on Water Supply, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, 
Mar. 21, 1889, at 2 (naming Ashburnham, Maynard, Millbury, and New Bedford); see 
also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 198 n.2 (adding Ayer and Malden); see infra 
part V-B and text accompanying note 123. 
103. Legislative Hearings, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 1,1889, at 6. 
104. Danger to Manufactures, BOSTON DAILY GWBE, Mar. 7, 1889, at 4 (evening 
ed.). The editorial read: 
The manufacturing interests of Massachusetts are in great danger of being 
crushed between an upper and a nether millstone. Already they are com­
pelled to pay heavy taxes on all their raw materials and machinery. Already 
they are forced to buy coal in Pennsylvania iristead of drawing from the 
cheaper supply of Nova Scotia and Cape Breton. And now it is proposed to 
deal them a still heavier blow, and allow the water power by which New Eng­
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An editorial in the Fall River Daily Evening News related 
Pratt's arguments and those of several opposing participants at the 
March 12 hearing.lOS The damages section of the draft under dis-
land has attained her present position to be destroyed without making com­
pensation to the ruined owners of the mills and factories dependent on it. 
This is the true meaning of the insidioUs order introduced in the Legisla­
ture some time since and referred to the water supply committee. ,Its language 
is well calculated to conceal the true effect aimed at. Under the guise of giving 
to towns that take or may hereafter take the water of large ponds the same 
rights that the State now has in the waters of these ponds, it is really designed 
to enable towns to drain every mill stream in the Commonwealth supplied by 
such ponds, and 'to pay no damages for thus confiscating valuable property. 
This is the true effect of the proposed bill, and no doubt its promoters are well 
'aware of it. Whether the intended victims are equally well informed will be 
seen at the hearing next Thesday. 
. It was generally supposed, until a few'months ago, that the Constitution 
of Massachusetts afforded protection against an injustjce of this character. In 
November [sic, the case was decided October 29], hoWever; the Supreme 
Court ruled [in Watuppa 11] that because our forefathers had'decreed that the 
great ponds should be open to the pilblic for fishing antJ fowling; therefore the 
State was at liberty to do as it pleased with them regardless of any rights in 
streams flowing from them. However sound this position may be in law, it 
cannot affect the question of legislative action. This Commonwealth' cannot 
afford to exact from its manufacturers all that it may be entitled to take. If the 
ordinance of our ancestors is in favor of the proposed law,their practice at any 
rate is against it; for prior to 1886 there was no instance of allowing a town to 
take water without compelling it to pay damages. We think the rule laid down 
by the court is more honored in the brel}ch than \n t~e observance, and depre­
cate any legislation which unjustly'encroacnes upon private rights. 
, , ' 
Id. 
105. The Legislature. Great Po~ds, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 13, 
1889, at 3. The paper reported: 
The legislative committee on water supply yesterday gave a hearing on 
the question of giving to towns the rights now held by the State in great 
ponds.... 
. . . [Representative Pratt] wanted legislation on general principles to em­
body the decision of the majority of the supreme court in the Fall River 
Watuppa reservoir case. He argued that towns should be allowed to take 
water from great ponds for domestic and fire purposes without compensation 
for damages any more than the State itself would be liable. He did not believe 
in private water companies, but, he would have cities and towns furnish them­
selves with water. He had not included ~ities in the, bills because their, water 
supply might necessitate so extensive a taking of water privileges as to be a 
public calamity for which damages should be paid. But as the court has de­
cided that the mill owners have' no vested rights in th~ waters of great ponds, 
he would have that principle clearly laid down in statue [sic] law, so that towns 
would not be liable for vexatious suits for damages. 
Judge E.C..Bumpus, of Quincy, said that the supreme Court recently de­
cided that when the towns take water they must pay damages to cover all time, 
but these cases have gone back for retrial. He denied now that any retroactive 
legislation could be passed, and ,claimed that the State could not give away 
rights and then take them back. The poliCy of the State has been, as shown by 
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cusslon provided that: 
[N]o action for the recovery of damages arising out of the taking 
or using by any town of the waters of a great pond shall be com­
"menced or sustained by any littoral owner or riparian proprietor 
on the shores of such pond or the bank of any stream flowing or 
fed therefrom against a town so taking or using such waters.106 
This preclusive "language no doubt inflamed the mill owners and the 
company still further. 
Another hearing on the same bill was announced for March 20. 
An editorial in the Boston Daily Globe that" morning, Save the 
Ponds and Streams!, alleged that without the mills, thousands of 
workers would be unemployed.107 The evening editorial, Towns' 
over 200 water acts, to have compensation made for water so taken. He said 
he would submit a brief communication to the committee showing the reasons 
why any retroactive legislation would be unconstitutional. From 1712 to the 
present, legislation has been favorable to the mill ownerS. 
H.G. Barker, of Cambridge, representing the Revere Copper Company, 
said litigation was but just begun and urged that the Legislature should be 
cautious and conservative in this matter. He claimed that when the State 
granted ponds to towns, the grant included the land under the water. He be­
lieved the State would not take away from the mill owners the rights already 
given them. He further claimed that the mill owners have acquired now their 
rights by undisturbed occupation and possession for a long term of years. 
Id. Barker ultimately prevailed with his prescription theory in Attorney Gen. v. Revere 
Copper Co., 25 N.E. 605 (Mass. 1890). This argument was not offered in Watuppa 11, 
presumably because the company's charter was too recent to establish prescription. In 
Revere Copper, the company showed that the mill and its predecessors in title had low­
ered the height of the pond since 1770, a period of 120 years. Id. at 606. The reservoir 
company had only been incorporated half as long. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River 
("Watuppa I"), 134 Mass. 267, 269-70 (1883) 
106. Free "Water for Towns, supra note 98. 
107. Save the Ponds and Streams!, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 20, 1889, at 4 
(morning ed.). The editorial stated: 
There is another hearing at the State House today, beginning at 10 a.m., 
on the proposed cession cif the' State's rights in the ponds and water-ways to 
the towns, within whose borders they are situated. 
We have already called attention to the dangerous.character of this prop­
osition. The water-ways belong to the, people of the State, and the people 
would very soon lose all control over them if the State rights were given to the 
towns; because many towns would sell or give away the exclusive right to the 
ponds and streams. It would be most obnoxious to ordinary people to see a 
pond or stream where the public from time immemorial has had the right to 
row or fish, turned into the private property of some wealthy person. Besides, 
many ponds would be dried up by those who covet the land they occupy; and 
that would destroy the source of water supply for many a mill stream, which 
would ruin many a vahiable plant and throw large numbers of working people 
out of employment. , 
The Legislature must not be allowed to giVe away the State's right to the 
water bodies-that is, the people's rights....:...without a vigorous protest. 
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Water Supply-Mill Owners Who Want To Get Power Cheap, de­
scribed what transpired at the hearing, where Louis D. Brandeis 
presented the case for the company and its witnesses. lOS The Fall 
River Daily Evening News reported the company's position to be 
that the proposal "would do irreparable injury to mill privileges on 
streams flowing out of great ponds, that private property would be 
most unjustly confiscated, and the Watuppa decision was against 
justice and still of doubtful authority."l09 
The committee agreed on a general water supply bill to report 
to the legislature on April 2. Its powers to take water were very 
broad, and its provisions for paying compensation quite narrow, 
although by no means as stringent as originally proposed.110 This 
bill only prohibited a suit until water had actually been diverted. It 
Id. 
108. Town's Water Supply. Mill Owners Who Want to Get Power Cheap, BOSTON 
DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 20, 1889, at 2. (evening ed.): The newspaper reported: ' 
The hearing on the order as to giving to towns taking their water from 
great ponds the same rights 'as the State now has, brought out a large number 
of mill owners and others at the morning's session of the committee on water 
supply. Louis D. Brandeis had the conduct of the case for the remonstrants. 
The speakers ... [a]ll spoke in remonstrance .... Mr. Herschel spoke of 
the narrowness of the margin by reason of which the great paper milling inter­
est of the Western part of the State is kept alive and of the danger of interler­
ing with the present status of affairs. In the course of his evidence he spoke 
favorably of the English system of compensating reservoirs, and said it could 
only benefit communities and mill-owners, while no one could be harmed by 
it. ' 
James B. Francis of Lowell, an engineer and water-power expert, said that 
the proposed legislation would bear hardly upon the smaller class of mill own­
ers. Mr. Brandus [sic] then introduced the following as representing the lesser 
mill interests: B.S. Binney of Shirley spoke of the fact that insecurity in the 
matter of water powers within the State rendered it impossible to raise money 
on many of them 'and thought that inasmuch as Massachusetts has no coal 
supply, the State should exercise extreme caution in regard to interfering with 
vested water rights. . 
F,W. Wood of Woodville was strenuously opposed to the proposed mea~ 
sure, as was also A.S. Morrison of Braintree. Mr. Brandus [sic] followed with 
some remarks, in which he defended the remonstrants from the charge made 
by Mr. Pratt [who proposed the bill] in his speech at the former hearing, that 
they were "squatters." He went on to show the magnitude of the interests 
involved by stating that there were over 1200 great ponds in the State with a 
water acreage of 93,000 acres. The rights were the result of the confidence of 
mill owners for over 200 years that the State would protect them in the out­
come of their labor and foresight. What was proposed would be striking 
blindly at many interests, and for reasons of a trivial nature. 
Id. See infra § V-B. ,­
109. The City., Hearing on Water Supply, supra note 102. 
110. General Water Supply. Comprehensive Bill from the Committee, BOSTON 
DAILY GLOBE, Apr. 2, 1889, at 3 (morning ed.). 
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did not pass, and on May 7 the House adopted the report of Bran­
deis' cotnmittee.ll1 Despite an "energetic" defense by the defeated 
An act to define the powers and duties of cities and' towns authorized to 
supply their inhabitants with pure water. 
Section 1. Any city or town hereafter authorized by the Legislature to 
supply its inhabitants with pure water may, by such agency as the city or town 
may determine, besides taking and holding the waters it is authorized to take, 
also take and hold any water rights connected with such waters; may prevent 
the pollution of said waters; may collect, store and convey said waters into said 
city or town, and use and distribute and sell said waters to the inhabitants 
thereof; may' construct and maintain dams, reservoirs, storage basins, drains, 
conduits, pipes and aqueducts and erect buildings and machinery; may change 
the course of any streams within the water-shed of its source of supply; may 
carry any pipes, drains, conduits or aqueducts over or under any river, water­
course, tide water, railroad, highway or other way; may enter upon and dig up 
such road or way for the purpose of laying down, maintaining or repairing any 
pipe, drain, conduit or aqueduct, and may from time to time take, by purchase 
or otherwise, and hold any lands, rights or easements that said agency may 
deem necessary for carrying out the purposes aforesaid. 
Section 4. The city or town shall pay all damages that shall be sustained 
by any person in property by such taking of any waters, lands, rights or ease­
ments; and if any person sustaining such damage fails to agree with the city or 
town as to the amount of damages sustained, such damage shall be assessed 
and determined by a jury in the Superior Court for the county in which such 
property is situated ... within three years of such taking .... 
Section 5. No application shall be made to the court for the assessment of 
damages for the taking of any water or water rights, or for any injury thereto 
until the.water is actually withdrawn or diverted by the city or town; and any 
person or corporation whose water rights may be thus taken or affected, may 
make his application aforesaid at any time within three years from the time 
when the waters shall be ~rst actually withdrawn or diverted. 
[d. 
Compare with the damages provision of the original bill, supra text accompanying 
note 106. 
111. House Debates'the Elevator Bill and Great Pond Rights, BOSTON DAILY 
GLOBE, May 7, 1889, at 8. The Boston Daily Globe reported an opposition speech by 
"Johnson of Haverhill": 
For 250 years ... the citizens of Massachusetts have, under encouragement 
from the General Court, built up by their own enterprise, unaided by the 
State, the flourishing mills, villages and towns on the streams in this Common­
wealth. A large proportion, if not all, of these streams have their source or are 
fed by great ponds. 
Yet the gentlemen in the sixth division presents [sic] a bill here today 
which would take from the mills that support of nature which enables them to 
hold their position. 
Now, Mr. Speaker, I~t us for a few minutes consider what the effect would 
be if this bill were passed. You see the bill gives to towns the right to take the 
waters of a great pond to be used for any purpose (not alone for domestic or 
fire purpose), without giving any compensation to the riparian proprietor or 
littoral owner on the shores of such pond or along the lines of streams flowing 
therefrom, or, in other weirds, to the manufacturer [sic], who use and own the 
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bill's sponsor, it was "characterized a revolutionary bill, and was 
rejected by a decisive vote. "112 
Additional factors that influenced this vote will be discussed in 
the following sections, but even on its face it seems a correct resolu­
tion. The balancing of interests necessary to resolve controversial 
issues of this kind is usually more successful in a state legislature 
where all sides have an opportunity to debate, than when delegated 
to less diverse and potentially even more self-interested govern­
mental units.113 
B. The Exchange of Articles in Harvard Law Review 
Meanwhile, shortly after the second case was decided in Octo­
ber 1888, and at the same time as the debate on the water bill pro­
posal, three consecutive law review articles elaborated upon 
Watuppa II's majority and dissenting arguments in response to the 
bill. Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel Dennis Warren, Jr., wrote the 
first and third, and Thomas Stetson, a lawyer for Fall River in 
Watuppa I and II, the second. 
Warren was a close friend and former classmate of Brandeis' at 
Harvard Law School and a member of a prominent New England 
family with extensive paper mill holdings. After graduating, he had 
practiced with a Boston firm, Shattuck, Holmes & Munroe, in 
which Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was a partner. Warren per­
suaded Brandeis to return east from St. Louis, suggesting that they 
take advantage of his business and social contacts and form a part­
nership.114 They formed Warren & Brandeis in 1879, and in that 
water power of the streams. You see, Mr. Speaker, that it is no "picayunish" 
interest that would be affected by the passage of this bill. On the contrary: it 
would be detrimental, if not ruinous, to all the manufacturing interests of the 
Commonwealth that are in any way dependent on water for power, and it is a 
fact, Mr. Speaker, that one-half of the power used in Massachusetts today is 
water power. 
You will find that it is not the mill owners alone that will be affected. It is 
not the mill owner who is proprietor of the stores and houses in most instances 
in the community where the mill is established, but the value of these stores 
and houses is dependent upon the prosperity of the mill and when you strike a 
blow at the mills you strike a blow at all the industries in the town. 
In the language of one of the remonstrants at the hearing before the com­
mittee, and by the way, the gentleman was not a mill owner, "such action 
would seem to be an extreme case of State robbery such, as if done by an 
individual, the State would consider a penitentiary offence." 
Id. 
112. The Legislature, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, May 8, 1889, at 3. 
113. See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text. 
114. ALPHEUS T. MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 54-55 (1946) (citing a 
53 1995] THE WATUPPA PONDS CASES 
year Warren introduced Brandeis to his old boss, Holmes. The 
three often met socially, before Holmes was appointed to the 
supreme judicial court, and became close friends.us In 1888, War­
ren's father died and he left the practice to assume control of the 
family business.116 After that, the firms shared offices in the same 
building so the former partners could still see each other on a regu­
lar basis.u7 . 
It was Warren's idea that they should share the editorship of a 
law review to be started at Harvard.lls Brandeis eventually became 
a trustee and the law review's first treasurer.119 They contributed 
money, advice, and three jointly written articles. At Warren's sug­
gestion, the first two concerned the Watuppa Pond cases,120 to 
Which Brandeis referred in a letter of March 20, 1889: 
We are having a Water fight now which is quite as warm as the 
rag fight was a few years ago, with the advantage however of the 
Community being with us, instead of prima facie against us. I 
have been making public opinion by wholesale. The press is full 
of our editorials, the law reviews of our articles, & before the 
legislative committee on Water Supply we have had two hearings 
& another comes Monday.121 
letter dated May 30, 1879 from Brandeis to Warren}; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LoUIS D. 
BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADITION 4 (1981); STEPHEN W. BASKERVILLE, OF 
LAWS AND LIMrrATIONS: AN INTELLEcruAL PORTRAIT OF LoUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS 
75 (1994). 
115. MASON, supra note 114, at 63-64, 570; 1 LETTERS OF LoUIS D. BRANDEIS 39 
(Meivin I. Urofsky & David W. Levy eds., 1971). 
See also MASON, supra note 114, at 571, for the influence Brandeis later wielded 
over Holmes when the two were justices of the United States Supreme Court. 
116. 1 LETTERS OF LoUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 115, at 77 n.1. 
117. ALLON GAL, BRANDEIS OF BOSTON 12 (1980); BRANDEIS, supra note 115, at 
77-78 (citing a letter from Brandeis to his brother Alfred, March 20,1889, after Warren 
had left the firm). 
118. MASON, supra note 114, at 54; "HALF BROTHER, HALF SON," THE LETTERS 
OF LoUIS D. BRANDEIS TO FELIX FRANKFURTER 569 (Melvin I. Urofsky & David W. 
Levy eds. 1991). Warren had written to Brandeis, "I regard [Holmes] as the greatest 
American thinker in law ... I think we will make our discussions triangular with some 
benefit all around." [d. 
119. MASON, supra note 114, at 67-68; BASKERVILLE, supra note 114, at 78. 
120. See ALFRED LIEF, BRANDEIS: THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN 
IDEAL 50-51 (1936).· 
The last and vastly more famous article was The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (189O), inspired by the socially prominent Warren's resentment at having his private 
life discussed in newspaper society columns after he married the daughter of the ambas­
sador to Britain. LIEF, supra at 51. See also Philippa Strum, BRANDEIS: BEYOND PRO­
GRESSIVISM 135 & n.65 (1993); BASKERVILLE, supra note 114, at 82-88. 
121. 1 LETTERS OF LoUIS D. BRANDEIS, supra note 115, at 78. 
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Sounding the theme of settled expectations, their first law re­
view article, dated December 15, 1888, was incensed over the dan­
gers to mill owners in a "great manufacturing community," who had 
expended capital in reliance upon the uninterrupted flow of water 
and built factories "upon nearly every stream in Maine and Massa­
chusetts, which [was] favorably situated and capable of furnishing 
water-power."122 As previously mentioned, Fall River's 1886 water 
act was immediately followed by statutes granting to cities and 
towns the same right that the state had, to appropriate water from 
great ponds without paying compensation. As a result of the pas­
sage of these statutes, Brandeis and Warren envisioned a wide­
spread curtailment of waterpower.123 They strongly asserted that 
compensation should be paid to mill owners and examined state 
cases in detail for support.124 
John Henry Wigmore, autho,r of A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICJ\N SYSTEM 
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, told the following story: 
"A few months after'l was admitted to the bar, 1 was going along Wash­
ington Street, Boston (I remember almost the very place), one Monday, when 
1 met Louis Brandeis. (He was then known as the 'young Choate' of the Bos­
ton Bar). He said to me, 'Do you want to earn $1001' Suppressing a near­
faint, 1 answered, 'Most hungrily 1 do.' He said, 'I am counsel for some mills 
and must argue next week before· a legislative Committee against a bill to 
condemn all public lakes in Massachusetts for municipal water supplies. 
Before Saturday night, 1 must know what is the total potential water power 
available from Massachusetts lakes.' 'But,' 1 said, 'where does it tell what the 
totai is?' He answered, 'Nobody knows; that is just the point.' 'Well,' 1 asked, 
'tell me how to figure it out, at least.~ He answered, 'I don't know how. And 1 
haven't got time to find out. That is why 1 employ you.' 'Well,' 1 said, 'I would 
do blinder things than that for $100. Next Saturday night, you said?' 'Yes,' he 
ended, 'results by next Saturday.' You can imagine what 1 went through, that 
week. But I had to find out, and I did find out." 
WILLIAM R. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE: SCHOLAR AND REFORMER 15 (1977) 
(quoting Wigmore, "Independent Research Work," 2. Remarks to the Northwestern 
University Law School Class of 1915 (Wigmore Collection». Brandeis actually paid 
Wigmore $50 more than he had offered, and said it was for "your very valuable services 
in the great pond question." Id. (citing letter from Louis D. Brandeis to Wigmore, 
April 2, 1889 (Wigmore Collection». In a letter to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., on Feb. 
6, 1916 (the year Brandeis was appointed associate justice of the Supreme Court), Wig~ 
more wrote that he considered this his first genuine retainer. Id. 
, In contemporary dollars, $150 was approximately equivalent to $6400, a considera­
ble sum for a week's work, even today. See supra note 28. 
For the "rag fight," see STRUM, supra note 120, at 17. 
122. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 198. 
123. See Warren & Brand~is, supra pote 26, at 198 n.2; see also Watuppa Reser­
voir Co. v. Fall River ("Watuppa II"), 18 N.E. 465, 473 (Mass. 1888). Other towns were 
said to have been holding off until Watuppa II was decided before proposing such legis­
lation. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 198 n.2 See supra notes 101-03 and ac­
companying text. , 
124. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 202-11. 1\vo Maine cases were in­
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They argued that riparian owners on a stream ("whatever its 
source") were traditionally entitled to the natural flow of water 
without diminution, subject to the reasonable use of the proprietors 
above.125 Thus, mills on rivers flowing from great ponds deserved 
no different treatment. The rights of riparian owners were property 
within the meaning of the Constitution, and not even for a public 
purpose could the legislature deprive mills of the flow of water 
without paying compensation.126 They asserted, as the Watuppa II 
dissent had,127 that the state had no exceptional rights to great 
ponds under the ordinance, which only reserved them to towns for 
public use.128 
A private land owner whose property completely surrounded a 
small pond, with no outlet stream, owned it completely and could 
do what he liked with the water. But if the pond had an outlet, if it 
was "a link in a chain through which water made its course from the 
Ipountains to the sea,"129 he would only have the reasonable use of 
the water and could not divert ·or destroy it. The state's rights in 
great ponds with outlet streams could be no better.13o The public 
right to such ponds only extended to its use of the water as a pond, 
not to. ownership of the water itself.131 
Brandeis and Warren concluded: 
It is a wide departure from the spirit which has in the past led the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts to foster its manufacturing in-. 
dustries by every means in its power, and the decision is to be 
regretted especially, because it comes at a time when all the re­
straints imposed by the Constitution and the courts are needed to 
protect private property from the encroachments of the 
Legislature.132 
In almost immediate response, Stetson's article of February 15, 
cJuded in the examination, as the ordinance was also a part of that state's law. Id. at 
209. 
125. Id. at 198-99. 
126. Id. See also STEINBERG, supra note 31, at 140-41 (discussing the difficulties 
the law encountered rationalizing the concept of running water as property). 
127. 18 N.E. at 475-77. 
128. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 202. 
129. Id. at 200. 
130. Id. at 200-02, 211. Brandeis and Warren took issue only with the public's 
"right to destroy" the ponds, not with its right to use them or with the legislature's right 
to regulate their uses. Id. at 211. . 
131. Id. at 210-11. 
132. Id. at 211; see supra note 96 and accompanying text regarding the mill acts, 
and infra notes 224-53 and accompanying text. . 
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1889, took issue with the claim that the ponds were part of a water­
course.133 He did not contest the cornmon law rights of riparian 
owners, but denied that title to running water could be extended to 
these ponds' assertedly still waters.l34 The law of lakes and not the 
law of watercourses had to apply to water that did not flow,even if 
the lake had an outlet stream; and no rule prohibited the diversion 
of still water.135 to apply the cornmon law to great ponds "would 
be a hypothecation forever of these' glorious free public reservoirs, 
to pay claims of mill-sites'and bank-owners."136 For the majority in 
Watuppa II and this author, the "colonial wisdom" of the ordinance 
made it unnecessary for the public to "pay for its water to the 
miller"; principles of . "loftier utility" controlled in' the 
Commonwealth.137 
Brandeis and Warren's April 15 rebuttal138 alleged that there 
was a "slight current" near the channel into the south pond and the 
point at which the city took water was a short distance away; only 
the body of the pond was still.139 The ponds' perceptible current 
entitled them to be classified as a watercourse. Distinguishing the 
degree of flow required might be "unpractical and unscientific," but 
they asserted that the Watuppa ponds met the requirements.l40 
The "private ownership of water-power". had been unques­
tioned in Massachusetts until these cases; no "paramount right of 
the public" to water power had been recognized until the 1886 
act.141 True, the ordinance had predated the Constitution, and, de­
spite its limitation on private property, admittedly could have been 
transformed into a settled rule of property through, long compli­
ance. However, the common law had prevailed instead, and it now 
defied both common law and constitutional principles to "extend by 
forced interpretation an ancient ordinance to a new application 
subversive of a well established and long undisputed rule of 
property."142 
133. Thos. M. Stetson, Great Ponds, 2 HARV. L. REV. 316, 316-17 (1889). 
134. Id. at 320. 
135. Id. at 324-25. 
136. Id. at 320. 
137. Id. at 330-31. 
138. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Law of Ponds, 3 HARV. L. 
REv. 1 (1889) [hereinafter The Law of Ponds). . 
139. Id. at 3. 
140. Id. at 18. 
141. Id. at 9 n.l. This argument, reiterates that of the Watuppa II dissent, 
Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River ("Watuppa II"), 18 N.E. 465, 478 (Mass. 1888) 
(Knowlton, J., dissenting). .' 
142. The Law of Ponds, supra note 138, at 9 n.1, 22. 
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Brandeis and Warren ultimately won this debate when the gen­
eral water bill was defeated on May 7, but perhaps not entirely for 
the reasons they expressed. A strict application of tpe colony ordi­
nance, such as their opponents Stetson, Representative Pratt, and 
the Watuppa II majority advocated, would never account for water 
once it flowed from a great pond, ~s it did in many instances.143 But 
the mill acts, whose pro-industry spirit Brandeis and Warren and 
the Watuppa II dissent invoked, simply immunized mills somewhat 
against suits by proprietors whose land was flooded and did not by 
themselves grant rights to the flow of water or guarantee compensa­
tion to mills in the eve.nt of a diminution,144 The common law 
would have provided damages for the mills, but there· was no appar­
ent way to apply it. Given these choices, the problem seemed insol­
uble. The proper balance among these competing interests was by 
no means clear, and whether the ponds had a current was too de­
batable a point upon which to rest a resoJution; it had, after all, lost 
in Watuppa II. .. . 
. Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, whom Brandeis and Warren 
credited with resurrecting the ordinance in this context,145 had ad­
dressed a similar situation almost forty years earlier in.dicta. In 
Cummings v. Barrett, mill tenants on a stream that originated in a 
great pond claimed the exclusive right to control all of its water; 
they sought to enjoin the cutting and taking of ice from the pond, 
which might deplete the amount of water they needed to power 
their mills.l46 Shaw wrote:. 
We are not aware that [the colony ordinance] has ever been al­
tered. What the rights are of adjacent or riparian owners of land 
bordering on such ponds, has, we believe, never been the subject 
of adjudication or discussion .... But in the advanced state of 
agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, and with the increased 
value of land and all its incidents, there will probably be hereaf­
ter increased importance to the question, whether and to what 
extent such riparian proprietors have a right to the use of the 
waters, for irrigating land, for steam-engines, for manufactories 
which require a large consumption of water, and for the supply of 
their own icehouses, for delivery to neighbors, and for more dis­
tant traffic. 
In a case between the owners of a mill with the privilege of a 
143. See supra § I. 
144. See supra note 96 ~nd sources cited therein. 
145. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 26, at 202-03. 
146. 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 186, 187 (1852). 
58 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:29 
mill stream, and the riparian owner of land, on a large pond, sup­
plying such mi~l stream, the nearest analogy perhaps, and that is 
apparently a strong one, is to that of riparian proprietors, on a 
running stream.147 
Apparently this celebrated justice would have agreed with Brandeis 
and Warren and allowed the common law rule to regain its vitality 
once water left agreat pond. . 
At the same time as the debate on the water bill, a strike in Fall 
River highlighted the mills' importance to an increasinglyindustri­
alized and complex community. 
C. The Fall River Weavers' Strike 
In 1884, the Fall River mills cut the wages of all laborers by 
twenty percent on the ground that the Democratic administration, 
led by Grover Cleveland, might reduce the tariff. After he tried to 
. do so and failed, the mills rescinded the pay cuts for all classes of 
labor except one. Five years later the weavers, the poorest paid and 
least skilled workers in the mills, were still ten percent short of their 
1884 salaries, despite the election of Benjamin Harrison, a Republi­
can who advocated a high tariff.l48 The weavers requested several 
times that the Manufacturers' Board of Trade restore their wages, 
to no avail.t49 The manufacturers claimed that the weavers had not 
recouped their 1884 salaries because they had been better paid than 
other mill workers150 and, at salaries averaging eight dollars a week, 
the weavers were as well paid in Fall River as anywhere.151 At­
tempts to negotiate failed, and on March 12, 1889, a front page 
headline in the Boston Daily Globe read: Silent Looms. Fall River 
147. Id. at 188. . 
148. Editorial, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 18, 1889, at 4 (morning ed.); No 
Signs of Weakening. Staying Powers of Wellvers To Be Tested Today, BOSTON DAILY 
GLOBE, Mar. 19, 1889, at 5 (morning ed.). 
149. Philip T. Silvia, Jr., The Spindle City: Labor, Politics, and Religion in Fall 
River, Massachusetts, 1870-1905, at 464-65 (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Fordham University (New York)); Weavers' Meeting, An Increas~ of Wages Asked, 
FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Jan. 30, 1889, at 2. Only 300 of 7000 weavers 
attended the meeting although the attempt to organize had been ongoing for a year, 
since January 1888, when the last general raise was given and the weavers felt slighted. 
Labor's Battle. Beginning of the Great Strike for More Wages, FALL RIVER DAILY HER­
ALD, Mar. 11, 1889, at 4. . 
150. Weavers and Spinners. The Former Threaten a Strike, FALL RIVER DAILY 
EVENING NEWS, Feb. 28, 1889, at 2; The Weavers, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, 
Mar. 7, 1889, at 2. 
15l. Will Strike Monday. '. So the Carrollton Hall Meeting Decides, FALL RIVER 
DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 9, 1889, at 2. 
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Weavers Begin the Battle. General Surprise at the Number Enlisted. 
Seven Thousand Already Engaged in the Struggle. Determination 
the Watchword of Leaders. Manufacturers Sanguine of Ultimate 
Victory.152 Never in all of Fall River's many mill strikes had so 
many workers left at one time,153 but the manufacturers were un­
concerned because of an oversupply of weavers.154 
The spinners' union was one of th~ strongest labor organiza­
tions in the country; it was well organized and recognized by the 
manufacturers. The weavers, however, had failed to establish a 
union until this strike, primarily because their large number (almost 
ten thousand) included men, women, and children. They were not 
as easy to control or mobilize as the spinners, whose union had only 
about eight hundred adult male members.155 The weavers also 
tended to be indifferent to trade unionism, a problem that plagued 
them for years.156 
When the new union ordered the-strikers to avoid trouble and 
stayaway from the mills, however, its orders were obeyed.157 The 
spring weather was good lmd the strike was almost a vacation to 
workers accustomed to "the stuffy, noisy weave rooms inside the 
grim looking mills."158 Between four and five thousand strikers at­
tended a meeting in the piuk.159 Spirits were high, and the weavers' 
152. Silent Looms. Fall River Weavers Begin the Battle, supra note 28. 
153. [d. The local papers claimed that even more weavers were on strike, 8000 to 
9000, and that 80% to 90% of the city's 45,000 looms were still. All Out. Weavers Very 
Generally Obey the Order to Strike, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 11, 1889, 
at 2.' . 
Fall River experienced greater labor unrest than other Massachusetts manufactur­
ing centers. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 
1830-1900, at 96-97 (1982), which cites a contemporary politician's conclusion that the 
power the unions wielded encouraged concern only with self-interest by both workers 
and employers. Each side, therefore, was more inclined to use heavy-handed tech­
niques to achieve its goals, unlike other cities where mutual concern and the spirit of 
negotiation were paramount. 
154. Silvia, supra note 149, at 466; All Out. Weavers Very Generally Obey the 
Order to Strike, supra note 153. 
155. Labor's Hosts in Line. Weavers to Test Their Strength Today, BOSTON DAILY 
GLOBE, Mar. 11, 1889, at 1 (morning ed.) .. 
156. Silvia, supra note 149, at 470-74. 
157. Silent Looms. Fall River Weavers Begin the Battle, supra note 28. 
158. All Merry. Fall River Weavers in Holiday Attire Fill the Streets and Public 
Parks, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 12, 1889. On Wednesday the headline read, Few 
Knobsticks. More Weavers Desert Their Looms. The Great Strike Becomes Contagious. 
Out of a Total of 9000, only 310 Remain at Work. 42,000 Looms Cease Their Busy 
Clatter. Secretary Connelly Well Pleased with the Outlook. BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, 
Mar. 13, 1889, at 8 (morning ed.). 
159. Labor's Battle. Beginning of the Great Strike for More Wages, supra note 
149; All Out. Weavers Very Generally Obey the Order to Strike, supra note 153. 
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only terms were "unconditional surrender."l60 But the strike had 
been ordered with an almost empty treasury and no means to sup­
port thousands of weavers; the lack of sound leadership. was appar­
ent within the first few days.161 
A connection was swiftly made between the strike and the pro­
posed general water bill. A Boston Daily Globe editorial entitled 
The Title to Ponds and Streams appeared the next morning-the 
day of the hearing before the water supply committee-predicting 
the demise of the mills and the jobs they provided and pleading 
with people of all political beliefs to protect the rights of the mill 
owners.162 The strike also got somber treatment in the local papers. 
The Fall River Daily Evening News pleaded that "appeals to preju­
dice and passion should be avoided" given the seriousness of the 
massive unemployment to the community, whether voluntary or in­
160. Few Knobsticks. More Weavers Desert Their Looms, supra note 158. 
161. The Third Day of the Strike, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 13, 
1889, at 2. 
162. The Title to Ponds and Streams, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 12, 1889, at 4 
(morning ed.). The editorial read: 
Many valuable mills in this State and many thousands of working people 
are dependent upon water power. All who are interested in any way in main­
taining the water supply in the mill streams or elsewhere should attend the 
hearing at the State House beginning at 10:30 today, to show cause why the 
pending resolve relating to the ponds and streams of the State should not be 
adopted. 
All rights in the lakes and rivers of Massachusetts are now vested in the 
State. But it is proposed to give to the towns all the rights which the State 
possesses in the lakes, ponds and streams within those towns. The effect 
would be to enable any town to dry up any pond within its borders, and with it 
any mill stream that may take its rise in these waters, without any compensa­
tion to the owners of mills, whose plant would be ruined, or to the working 
people who would be thrown out of employment. 
The just and proper title to the water ways and water bodies rests in the 
Commonwealth. So it has always been, and so it should remain. The State 
will make the gravest mistake if it lets its ancient rights - which are merely 
the ancient rights of the people - go out of its hands or divide them with 
towns or individuals. If that is done it will not be long before the people at 
large will have lost all control of the water of their State, as they have of the 
land: for many towns will sell or give away the exclusive right to sources of 
water supply. 
This is a matter of so much importance, both to the large milling interests 
of the present time and to future generations, that the people, without regard 
to party, should make themselves heard and felt in relation to it. No legislator 
who values popular rights, as handed down from the colonial days, or who 
regards the great manufacturing interests, ought to vote for such a measure. 
Id. See supra part V-A. Despite the claim Brandeis made in his March 20 letter, see 
supra text accompanying note 121, this editorial and the others cited in part V-A were 
all anonymous. 
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voluntary, and the importance of an expeditious solution.163 
The strikers received support from weavers in other towns,164 
but other departments within the Fall River mills operated as usual. 
The spinners, for example, knew that the yarn they spun was being 
sold at a profit to other businesses in New England. As long as they 
worked, the weavers had no hope of causing the manufacturers any 
economic distress.165 Indeed, "manufacturers, so far from being 
alarmed at the prospect of a loss of earnings . . . regard [ ed] the 
strike with philosopical [sic] serenity as an unavoidable incident, 
like the break-down of the machinery of a mill."166 
The mills refused an attempt by the state board of arbitration 
to arrange a meeting between the parties,167 because to recognize 
the new union would perpetuate an ongoing threat.168 They swore 
they would not raise salaries no matter how long the strike lasted169 
and continued to assert that they paid higher wages for weaving 
than other manufacturing centers.17° The board and the manufac­
turers' committee, however, did agree that if the weavers went back 
to work first they might negotiate.171 The arbitrators requested that 
the weavers do so for three months at their old wages while the 
state studied the situation. The Weavers' Association Committee 
reported the proposal to the executive committee and it was quickly 
163. The Strike, FALL RNER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 13, 1889, at 2. 
164. Way Not Paved Toward an Amicable Settlement of the Fall River Strike. State 
Arbitrators a Little Premature in Believing Progress Had Been Made, BOSTON DAILY 
GLOBE, Mar. 16, 1889, at 1 (evening ed.). 
165. All Out. Weavers Very Generally Obey the Order to Strike, supra note 153; 
The Third Day of the Strike, supra note 161; Silvia, supra note 149, at 467-68. 
166. A Word to the Weavers, FALL RNER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 16, 1889, 
at 2. 
167. The Fourth Day. Weavers Hold a Variety Show on the Park, FALL RNER 
DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 14, 1889, at 2. 
168. Will Not Go Back. Striking Weavers Refuse to Compromise, BOSTON DAILY 
GLOBE, Mar. 16, 1889, at 5 (morning ed.); Unionism Ignored. Weavers May Apply for 
Work as Individuals, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 17,1889, at 1 (Sunday ed.); Decline 
to Arbitrate. Weavers' Committee Reject the Offer of the State Board, FALL RNER 
DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 16, 1889, at 2. 
169. The Fourth Day. Weavers Hold a Variety Show on the Park, supra note 167. 
170. The Strike, supra note 163. The FALL RNER DAILY EVENING NEWS 
reported: 
It is said that Lowell pays 20 cents for a cut of 50 yards, which would be at the 
rate of 18 cents for 45 yards, for which Fall River pays 19 cents, or a cent in 
favor of the Fall River weaver over the Lowell weaver. It is held also that in 
Lowell a weaver is not allowed as many looms as in Fall River, and that the 
average wages of weavers there will not exceed $7 per week. 
Id. 
171. Id. 
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rejected.172 On this, the fifth day of the strike, nine thousand weav­
ers were out of work.173 
The following week,174 the weavers' committee suggested that 
the strikers might return to work if the manufacturers gave a tokep. 
raise of five percent in the meantime, pending a settlement by the 
board of arbitration.175 The mill owners refused arid only repeated 
their earlier of(erP6 The Thursday ·evening, Boston Daily Globe 
reported: 
The manufacturers have shown their teeth, and by refusing to 
arbitrate have practiCally paralyzed all the industries of the city. 
The·complaints uttered against the corporations this morning are 
loud and long. All the traders, and every person who depends 
upon the pr()sperity of the city at large for his living, are making 
bitter complaints. They say that the mill owners are pigheaded, 
and that their refusal to submit to the terms offered by the State 
board of arbitration has put machinery in motion that. will cost 
the city a million of money before it can be stoppedP7 
Seventy thousand people lived in Fall River, all of them depen­
dent in one way or another on the mills; between twelve and twenty 
thousand workers had been put out of work by the strike.178 The 
172. Will Not Go Back. Striking Weavers Refuse to Compromise, supra note 168. 
Unionism Ignored. Weavers May Apply for Work as Individuals, supra note 168. 
173. Will Not Go Back. ,Striking Weavers Refuse to Compromise, supra note 168. 
174. No Signs of Weakening, supra note 148. According to this article, the strike 
now included 15,000 people, about 10,000 of whom were weavers. The Strike. The 
Situation But Little Changed from Last Week, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 
19,1889, at 2;A Question ofEndurance. No Arbitration, No Compromise., FALL RIVER 
DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 21, 1889, at 2. 
175. Futile Officiousness, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 20, 1889, at 2; 
Another Proposition to Arbitrate, Fall River Daily Evening News, Mar. 20, 1889, at 2; A 
Question of Endurance. No Arbitration, No Compromise, supra note 174. 
176. Will it Avail? Weavers Persuaded to Arbitrate, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 
20, 1889, at 1 (morning ed.). 
The manufacturers were adamant: 
The agreement which the weavers had condescended to make would not re­
ceive the slightest notice from the board of trade. We will make no concession 
of anything, and if the weavers are willing to return to work on the old basis, 
we may then consider the advisability of leaving the' question of wages to the 
Board of Arbitration for investigation .... We are now paying the highest 
wages, and we will pay no more. We will fight this strike to the end, even if it 
lasts six months. 
Another Proposition to Arbitrate, supra note 175. 
177. To Count the Cost of the Cotton Kings' Obstinacy Reveals Some Ugly Facts, 
BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Mar. 21, 1889, at 5 (evening ed.). 
178. A Word to the Weavers, supra note 166 (estimating the number of people out 
of work at 20,000); The Eleventh Day. Convincing Proof that Wages Could Be Raised, 
1995] THE WATUPPA PONDS CASES 63 

fledgling weavers' union had managed to keep all but two thousand 
of the forty-five thousand looms idle for over two weeks, with little 
or no violence, despite "all the might of capital, and all the dread of 
poverty combined .... It was a wonderfulachievement."179 . But 
more and more weavers were returning to work every day,lSO and 
the Fall River Daily Evening News begged them to admit defeat.18l 
.' On March 27, .partly due to the efforts of a local minister, the 
front page headlines read, Battle Over. The Fall River Weavers 
Yield To Starvation's Gaunt Spectre. They Vote to Return To­
morrow. Decision o/the Executive Committee. Causes a Murmur at 
the Park, Until Good Parson Brown Appears. He Persuades the 
Strikers to Acquiesce.182 The state board of arbitration would con­
tinue its investigation and the union would attempt· to gain 
strength,183 but the weavers went back at their old wages. "All was 
lost but honor," the Boston Daily Globe claimed.l84 The Fall River 
Daily Evening News took a more qualified view. Each weaver lost 
$20 to $25, for a total gain to the mills of over $300,000 in wages not 
paid for fifteen days. The market for cloth actually improved from 
the· lack of production, which further benefitted the 
manufacturers. l85 
Mayor Jackson of Fall River spoke at several of the legislative 
hearings on the proposed general water bill.186· The mayor, predict­
ably, defended the principle of the 1886 act that had benefitted his 
city with free water. He also expressed the belief that individual 
cases should be evaluated as they arose, and opposed the general 
FALL RIVER DAILY HERALD, Mar. 22, 1889, at 4 (estimating the number at 12,000­
15,000). 
179. But Just Begun. Half a Million Sunk in the Weavers' Strike, BOSTON DAILY 
GLOBE, Mar. 26, 1889, at 1 (morning ed.). The relatively few mills in operation were 
operated mostly by unskilled children, who took "advantage" of the strike to learn the 
trade. ld. 
180. How Long Will it Last? Signs of Uneasiness Among the Weavers, FALL 
RrvER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 22, 1889, at 2. 
181. Set the Looms in Motion, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 22, 
1889, at 2. . 
182. BOSTON DAiLY GLOBE, Mar. 27, 1889, at 1 (evening ed.). 
183. The Strike Ended. Weavers Vote to Return To-Morrow, FALL RIVER DAILY 
EVENING NEWS, Mar. 27, 1889, at 2. 
184. Battle Over. The Fall River Weavers Yield to Starvation's Gaunt Spectre, 
supra note 182. 
185. The Strike and Its Results, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 28, 
1889, at 2. In 1989 dollars, the weavers lost between $853 and $1066.25; the total wages 
lost would be approximately $12,795,000. See supra note 28. 
186. See supra part V-A. 
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bill.l87 His lack of support may have been crucial to ~he bill's defeat 
and may seem perplexing without the perspective that the weavers' 
strike, which ended Marcil 27, gives to his point of view. The manu­
facturers' expectations, that the common law and their corporate 
charters gave them rights to the flow of streams, encouraged them 
to invest in their factories with confidence and provide jobs for the 
many thousands of workers un~mployed in Fall River at the same 
time as the bill was debated.· .. . 
. VI. WATUPPA Iff 
Watuppa II remained a problem for the mills. In 1891, the Fall 
River Evening News reported complaints about the high rates that 
were being charged for the city water. Some citizens solved the 
problem by drilling artesian wells. One company altered.a natural 
ravine through which a stream flowed so that it would function as a 
reservoir from which the· company could ·lay pipes to itsmills.l88 
187. Water Supply of Cities. Legislative Hearing, FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS, 
Apr. 25, 1889, at 1. The newspaper repoited: 
The bill before the committee, Thursday, is one prep·ared in the interest of 
manufacturing corporations and of the city of .Boston; it was a general bill 
regulating the water supply of cities and towns, and had in it the old provisions 
relating to the payment of damages, 'against which the city has successfully 
fought in the Legislature and the· courts within the last few yearS. 
The mayor; iIi his argument before the committee Thursday, presented 
the same line of argument adopted by.him at the other hearings as to general 
legislation-that cases should always be treated individually-the circum- . 
stances surrounding them, the diversity of rights was such that no general bill 
that was just and equitable could be passed at the present day; that the 
splendid property of the State in its ponds was a wealth that the Legislature 
should protect with the greatest prudence; that whenever interested parties 
presented their claims before the Legislature on the one side, and the people 
their claims on the other, full opportunity should be given both sides to be 
heard, and no surrender made prematurely by general legislation to anybody; 
that the wisdom which had characterized the legislation, and which had re­
served the ponds for uses not known, should be alike displayed by this Legisla­
ture in preserving, without gift to anybody, this great public property for 
whatever uses the future might bring forth. Replying to strictures made by the 
attorney of manufacturing interests against the legislation which Fall River 
had obtained, the mayor spoke strongly and forcibly in defense of its justice 
and equity. 
Id. See also The City. Hearing on Water Supply, supra note 102; Water From Great 
Ponds, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Mar. 26, 1889, at 3; Water Supplies for 
Cities and Towns, FALL RIVER WKLY. NEWS, Apr. 4, 1889, at 2. 
188. Cheaper Water Supply. Border City Mills Will Get .Its Water from Steep 
Brook, FALL RIVER EVENING NEWS, Aug. 26, 1891, at 8. 
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That year the reservoir company brought the case back to court.189 
To employ· the common law to protect the rights of the mill 
owners, the ponds had to be excluded from the scope of the ordi­
nance, which, as interpreted in Watuppa II, enabled Fall River to 
take the. ponds' water without compensation. Watuppa II had 
stated confidently that the ordinance was in force throughout the 
entire state,l90 despite its not having been "extend[ed] to those 
places by any positive enactment now known."191 In Watuppa III, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who had agreed with the majority in 
the second case that no compensation was due, now found for the 
mills based on an interpretation of new evidence that finely distin­
guished the state-wide application of the ordinance.l92 
The modem state ofMassachusetts was formed by the union of 
two colonies, Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay, in 1692.193 Fall 
River was in the part of the state· which had been Plymouth, but 
Massachusetts Bay had enacted the ordinance. In 1656 and 1680, 
while still independent, Plymouth had conveyed to private individu­
als, plaintiffs' predecessors in title, two large tracts of land; these 
"time-stained deed[s]" had apparently been forgotten.194 The first 
grant, the "Freemen's Purchase," included land on the Quequechan 
River and about half of the north pond; the second, the "Pocasset 
Grant" or "Purchase," included all of the south pond and the rest of 
the north.195 Holmes initially held that the latter deed conveyed 
"the ponds and the water-power embraced within its boundaries to 
the grantees as private owners," despite their having been men­
tioned only in the habendum, not in the granting clause.l96 
If these conveyances had been made before the ordinance was 
189. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River ("Watuppa I11"), 28 N.E. 257 (Mass. 
1891). 
190. ·See supra note 93 and accOmpanying text.· 
191. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Fall River ("Watuppa 11"), 18 N.E. 465, 471 (Mass. 
1888).. 
192. Watuppa III, 28 N.E. at 257-58. 
193. Mark Cheung, Rethinking the History of the Seventeenth-Century Colonial 
Ordinance: A Reinterpretation of an Ancient Statute, 42 ME. L. REV. 115, 127 (1990). 
See supra § I.. 
194. Real Estate. Wage Reduction Has a Depressing Effect, FALL RIVER DAILY 
GLOBE, Sept. 4, 1891, at 8; see also City Defeated. Water Suits Decided by the Supreme 
Court, FALL RIVER DAILY GLOBE, Sept. 3, 1891, at 7. 
195. Watuppa III, 28 N.E. at 257. The grants were also referred to collectively as 
"The Grand Deed." City Defeated. Water Suits Decided by the Supreme Court, supra 
note 194. 
196. Watuppa Ill, 28 N.E. at 257. The habendum clause read, "~II the above men­
tioned and bounded lands, with all and singular the woods, waters, coves, creeks, ponds, 
brooks, benefits, profits, privileges, and hereditaments whatsoever in before arising, ac­
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enacted,l97 the plaintiffs' rights would be safely established under 
the common law, as the ordinance explicitly exempted prior grants 
from its terms, "unless the freemen of the same town or the general 
court have otherwise appropriated them."198 If the conveyances 
had been made after 1692, plaintiffs would clearly come under the 
ordinance's jurisdiction and Watuppa II would apply.199 But as they 
were made during the interim; the issue for the court was whether 
the ordinance was law in Plymouth Colony before its union with 
Massachusetts pU1:suant to the Province Charter of 1692; 
Justice Holmes held that only "usage and ... judicial decision" 
showed that the ordinance extended to Plymouth before 1692, and 
that these were insufficient to alter private rights.2°O He cited an 
earlier case, Litchfield v. Scituate, for the proposition that "the time 
when the province charter passed the seals is indicated as the mo­
ment when ... the ordinance became applicable to that part of the 
state."201 Thus, the Watuppa ponds were exempt fromtheordi­
nance's terms before it had legal effect in Plymouth by having been 
granted into private hands. The ponds were not reserved for public 
use. The common law applied, and the mill owners on the Que­
que chan could not be deprived of their water, without due compen­
sation from the city.202 Although Wafuppa iI was still good-law in 
cruing, belonging, or thereto any ways appertaining, or to any part or parcel thereof." 
Id. 
197. The ordinance was first published in 1641 and amended every year until 
1648. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
198. Colony Ordinance, Section 2 (1647). 
199. See Chief Justice Shaw's opinion in Barker v. Bates, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 255, 
258 (1832) (stating that the ordinance was "a settled rule of property in every part of 
the State"). 
200. Watuppa III, 28 N.E. at 258. 
201. Id. (citing Litchfield v. Scituate, 136 Mass. 39, 47 (1883». 
It is unclear whether the ordinance should 'have been applied to other provinces 
even after 1692. On its face, the Province Charter stated that "all the local laws, made 
by the late governor and company of Massachusetts Bay, and the late government of 
New Plymouth, not repugnant &c., shall continue in force, for the respective places for 
which they were made and used." Barker, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) at 258. 
202. Watuppa III, 28 N.E. at 258. The rights of the Troy Cotton & Woolen Manu­
factory were not difficult to establish under this rationale, but the court had to strain a 
bit for the reservoir company. The reservoir company owned neither land nor water-' 
rights. It had, however, built a dam and controlled the water power for the benefit of 
the mills. These activities "show[ed] a sufficient possession, under the title of the own­
ers, to warrant the issuing of an injunction." Id. 
A headline the day of the decision read: Great Pond Law. Supreme -Court 
Reverses Its Opinion. Decision That Affects a Vast Deal of Property. The State's Power 
over Big Waters Limited. Fall River Must Pay for Its Drinking Supply. The article re­
ferred to the case' as "highly important," involving "millions of dollars' worth of prop­
erty." BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, Sept. 3, 1891, at 5 (evening ed.). An editorial comment 
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the portion of the state that had been Massachusetts Bay Colony, 
"the principles of State ownership there announced [did] not apply 
to these particular ponds, on account of the Pocasset deed. "203 
The company had prevailed over the city by utilizing previ­
ously unknown and ancient grants. It was an impressive piece of 
research and legal reasoning performed by "a New Bedford man, 
well known to lawyers"204 of the time, but· whose identity remains 
unknown to this researcher. 
The Fall River Daily Evening News referred to a compromise 
offer which the company had made before Watuppa III was de­
cided. The offer included an annual tax exemption of about $5000 
and the provision of some city water for the American Printing 
Company if the company were unable to satisfy its needs. The city 
had refused the offer, expecting that the judgment would be in its 
favor.205 An article in the Fall River Daily Herald suggested· that if 
the city had accepted the offer, it would have been in a better posi­
tion.206 The company's lawyer, however, seemed reasonable when 
he stated on the day of the decision: 
If we asked for it the judge might issue an injunction re­
straining the city from taking ~ater under the .act of 1886, but the 
reservoir company will· probably not do anything to interfere 
with the comfort of citizens. 
the next day said, "[t]he Massachusetts Supreme Court has decided that riparian own­
ers have rights by no means to be ignored." Editorial Points, BOSTON DAILY GLOBE, 
Sept. 4, 1891, at 4. 
203. The City. The Water Suits, FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING NEWS, Sept. 3, 
1891, at 1. 
204. Real Estate. Wage Reduction Has a Depressing Effect, supra note 194. 
For the response to the case in the Fall River papers, see, e.g., Against the City. 
Black Eye Given Fall River Today by the Supreme Court, FALL RIVER DAILY HERALD, 
Sept. 3, 1891, at 1; That Opinion. Text of the Ruling Against the Municipality, FALL 
RIVER DAILY HERALD, Sept. 4, 1891, at 1 ("It is declared that the decision of the [Mas­
sachusetts] [S]upreme [Judicial] [Clourt, that by the Pocasset grant the Watawpa [sic] 
company has a prior claim to the ponds, may be law, but it is not justice."). 
James Madison Morton, who had been counsel to the mills in the "Watuppa Nui­
sance Case" and in Watuppa 1 and 11, was appointed to the Supreme Court bench in 
1890. James Madison Morton: A Memorial, 248 Mass. 593, 594 (1924) (supp.). This 
was the same year that a relative· (perhaps his father, Marcus Morton, Jr., who wrote 
the opinions in those cases) retired as Chief Justice, having served twenty-one years on 
the bench. Id. Many of the articles on Watuppa III made the point that James Madison 
Morton took no part in the decision, and denied that his appointment had anything to 
do with the city losing the case. See, e.g., Against the City. Black Eye Given Fall River 
Today by the Supreme Court, supra. 
205. See, e.g., The Decision of the Water Suits, ·FALL RIVER DAILY EVENING 
NEWS, Sep~. 4, 1891, at 4. 
206. That Opinion. Text of the Ruling Against the Municipality, supra note 204. 
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The only thing for the Reservoir Company now to do is to 
prove what its damages have been and sue the city for the taking 
of water during the past five or six years. The company can stop 
the city from taking water in the future under the act of 1886. 
The city can take water under the old act, which requires the pay­
ment of damages, the amount of which will be assessed, as for- . 
merly, by three commissioners.207 
VII. AFTERWARDS 
Neither these opinions nor the law reviews portray the actual 
necessity for water power at the time.20s Even the contemporary 
newspapers give only a hint. In fact, steam had been gaining in 
importance for decades, as Stetson argued in Watuppa II. 209 By 
1860, Fall River had obtained about twenty-five percent of its 
power from steam,210 and by the early 1890s it had actually dis­
placed water in New England as the primary power source of the 
textile industry.211 Fall River's location on the shore enabled it to 
import coal cheaply, which gave it such an advantage over its major 
competitor, Lowell, that it superseded that city as the country's 
largest cotton mill center.212 That is not to say, of course, that water 
did not retain sufficient value for other purposes to justify the mills' 
considerable interest in it. 
In the same way that some of our modem environmental rule­
makings drag on for years only to become moot before they are 
ever resolved,213 the company and the city finally reached a perma­
nent compromise agreement the year after Watuppa III. Under it, 
the city was released from any past or future claims for damages 
arising from its appropriation of the ponds' water for public pur­
poses, provided it would supply the mills with water when the pond 
level fell too IOW.214 This was not an unreasonable burden on the 
207. The City. The Water Suits, supra note 203. 
208. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. 
209. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84. 
210. 1 HUNTER, supra note 27, at 486. 
211. SMITH, supra note 29, at 40. 
212. Id. at 54. In 1871, Representatives of Lowell corporations complained to the 
Massachusetts Railroad Commissioners about the high rates and inadequate service 
that made the transportation of coal to Lowell so expensive that it could not compete 
with Fall River. Id. at 54-55. 
213. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CON­
GRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 78 (1993) (discussing EPA rule­
making spanning 1971-1986). 
214. Agreement Between the City of Fall River and the Watuppa Reservoir Com­
pany and Others, June 6, 1892, RESERVOIR COMMISSION REPORTS, Dec. 6, 1897. 
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city by any means. By this time, water power, and the textile indus­
try itself, were nearly at an end all over New England. The success 
of Fall River as an industrial city 
had been based on the supremacy of steam as the source of 
power for new textile mills .... Fall River had definite locational 
advantages in comparison with most other New England textile 
centers. These continued to operate in some degree as long as 
this industry expanded in New England. But after 1890 their sig­
nificance was hidden by the rapid rise of print cloth mills in the 
South.2IS 
By the end of the century, the use of water power from the ponds 
was negligible. The ponds were polluted and stagnant, and served 
only to cool coal-powered mill engines.216 
The very fact that the water was superfluous is significant. The 
court did not bend over backwards to protect the company in 
Watuppa III because the water was vital to the mills and because 
the mills were vital to the community. Watuppa III was decided 
(correctly, in my view) because the seventeenth century deeds, re­
gardless of whether these immediate plaintiffs were aware of them, 
had been relied upon by their predecessors in interest to build an 
immense manufacturing enterprise. These expectations were not to 
be upset, even at this later date. The case was decided in favor of 
the mills because preserving· their settled expectations was simply 
the right thing to do. 
As noted, the author of Watuppa III was Warren and Brandeis' 
good friend, Oliver' Wendell Holmes, Jr. The three socialized fre­
quently and it was Brandeis who arranged a teaching position at 
Harvard Law School for Holmes in January of 1882, just before 
Holmes' appointment to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu­
setts.217 Given Brandeis' keen interest and participation in the 
controversy that followed the second opinion, it is tempting to spec­
215. SMITH, supra note 29, at 79 & ch. III. The advantages of being close to the 
cotton fields, advancing technology, and more lenient labor laws made the South a seri­
ous competitor; eventually it won out, leaving Northern mill cities ruined. "In 1909, 
southern production of print cloth constituted 36 percent of the national total. Fall 
River's dominance of the market was gone ...." Id. at 121. 
216. 1 HUNTER, supra note 27, at 534. Fall River had symbolized the triumph of 
steam power over water power. Id. In 1895, the Borden family opened "Cotton Mill 
Number 4," vastly increasing the city's textile capacity; it put almost six acres of machin­
ery in production. Id. at 535. But, only four years after Watuppa Ill, this waterpowered 
engine and its millworks were "virtually obsolete when installed." Id. 
217. MASON, supra note 114, at 64-65; BASKERVILLE, supra note 114, at 78 
(1994); WHITE, supra .note' 10, at 196-208. 
70 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:29 
ulate that he or Warren influenced Holmes to adopt their point of 
view in Watuppa III. Although it seems extremely likely that 
Holmes was aware of their efforts, I could find no evidence to sup­
port this hypothesis.218 
Later in his state court career, Holmes demonstrated his pro­
labor stance in his famous dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner.219 It is 
possible that in Watuppa III he was influenced by the Fall River 
strike (as Mayor Jackson may have been) and hoped that the weav­
erswould benefit vicariously by a decision in the company's favor. 
But if that were so, he would have been disheartened by a headline 
in the Boston Daily Globe the same day the Watuppa III decision 
was reported, Down They Go. Wages To Be Reduced in Fall River 
Mills. Cut of 10 Per Cent. Expected To Go into Effect Oct. 5. Low 
Prices for Prints the Cause Assigned. Operators' Course Causes Big 
Surprise. Spinners Postpone Action. Strike Probable.220 There 
never was any peace between the mills and the city until the mills 
were gone.221 
In 1994, there are neither mills nor waterfalls in Fall River. 
Bridges cross an empty gorge, the Quequechan having been relo­
cated to a culvert underneath Interstate 195 in 1960.222 Former mill 
buildings serve as outlet stores. North WatuppaPond is the city's 
main water source, and the South Pond fulfills its recreational 
needs.223 Thomas Stetson would be pleased. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal historians William Nelson and Morton Horwitz theorize 
that nineteenth century legal reasoning can be divided into two 
218. Professor Melvin I. Urofsky, who has edited many volumes of Brandeis' cor­
respondence, wrote me: "~know of no direct letters from Brandeis and Warren to 
Holmes ...." Letter from Melvin I. Urofsky to Deborah Paulus (Mar. 30, 1993) (on 
file with author). 
219. 44 N.E. 1077, 1081-82 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J. dissenting) (stating that the 
conflict between labor and management was as much competition as the more tradi­
tional kind, between businesses). 
220. BOSTON DAILY GLOBE,~Sept. 3, 1891, at 2 (morning ed). See WHITE; supra 
note 10, at 365 (discussing Holmes and legill realism). 
221. World War I gave Fall River a ten-year period of additional prosperity, but 
the South resumed its industrial advance after the war ended. SMITH, supra note 29, at 
121. See also Silvia, supra note 149, at 716 ("Fall River was an unfortunate forerunner 
of the national depression by five years."). 
222. The Quequechan River 1990, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL COMMITTEE 1, 11 
(1990). 
223. As a public park ultimately resulted, it seems much more reasonable that the 
city should have been required to compensate the mills. . 
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broad periods. In the early part of the century, before a court fol­
lowed a precedent, it considered whether the precedent furthered a 
desirable policy, such as the encouragement of economic growth. If 
not, the precedent was rejected on the grounds that society's needs 
had changed.224 But in the middle 1800s, when slavery became a 
major issue in national politics, "instrumentalism" gave way and 
was followed by a greater respect for precedent and a return to set­
tled principles' that derived from religion, American transcendental­
ism, and Enlightenment ideas about human rights.225 The 
formalism and the "scientific" jurisprudence of the last half of the 
century "'flatter[ ed] that longing for. certainty and for repose' that 
arose out of the fratricidal strife of the middle and the seeming so­
cial chaos of the end of the century."226 One aspect of this shift in 
focus was a reinvigorated interest in individual property rights.227 
The Watuppa Ponds cases reflect the struggle to reconcile two 
pairs of conflicts. First, there were conflicting contemporary expec­
tations, those of the mills that the river would continue to flow and 
those of the city that the ponds would supply its steadily increasing 
need for water. Second, there were conflicting ancient legal princi­
ples, the common law of water rights and the seventeenth century 
ordinance. In Holmes' Watuppa III decision, stable legal principles, 
and the mills, triumphed through his interpretation of the deeds to 
trump the ordinance. Thus, the decision, in its effect on at least part 
of the state echoed Shaw's 1852 dicta in Cummings v. Barrett228 and 
was consistent with the spirit of the times. Yet the legitimate needs 
ofthe public were in no way thwarted by the decision, as the settle­
ment a year later provided for them. Consequently, the correct 
conclusion, from the perspective of both public and private inter­
ests, was ultimately reached without any judicial undermining of 
settled principles. 
As discussed, Justice Holmes would hold, thirty-one years after 
224. NELSON, supra note 153, at 140; see generally, MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977). But see Harry N. Scheiber, 
Instrumentalism and Property Rights: A Reconsideration ofAmerican "Styles ofJudicial 
Reasoning" in the 19th Century, 1975 WIS. L. REv. l. 
225. NELSON, supra note 153, at 42-46; see generally, William E. Nelson, The Im­
pact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles ofJudicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Cen­
tury America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974) [hereinafter Impact of the Antislavery 
Movement]. 
226.. Impact of the Antislavery Movement, supra note 225, at 566 (citing Oliver W. 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897». 
227. NELSON, supra note 153, at 47-48. . 
228. 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 186 (1852). See supra text'accompanying notes 146-47. 
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Watuppa III, that the statute at issue in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon was a taking of the mining company's property without 
compensation and an interference with previously existing rights of 
contract, and thus formally open the regulatory takings question.229 
He wrote: 
When this seemingly absolute protection [of private property in 
the Fifth Amendment] is found to be qualified by the police 
power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the 
qualification more and more until at last private property disap­
pears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the 
Constitution of the United States.230 . 
The plaintiff in Mahon purchased his property under a deed 
that gave him only surface rights. Although the holding appears 
harsh, he and his predecessors in interest may have actually benefit­
ted from their bargain and their risk by negotiating a lower 
purchase price without the subsurface rights. In any case, his 
knowledge of his rights makes the case intuitively fair; his expect a,. 
tions were established in his deed.231 Although Holmes was forced 
to decide a "debatable and ... burning question[ ],"232 and created 
in that case an enigma for future·generations of lawyers to grapple 
with, still the deed as a representation of settled expectations was 
paramount and dispositive for him. Furthermore, his Mahon deci­
sion was compatible with takings opinions he wrote on the Massa­
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court at approximately the same time 
the Watuppa Ponds cases were before it.233 
Brandeis' positions are more complicated. It is clear that his 
legal philosophy underwent a significant change over time. His 
early career was dominated by a conservative belief in laissez-faire 
capitalism, perhaps unsurprising in the son of an entrepreneur.234 
This belief is apparent in his partnership with Warren, where most 
of his clients were small factory owners, and in his advocacy for the 
mills.235 Stephen Baskerville writes that at the time of the Watuppa 
229. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v .. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
230. Id. at 415. 
231. Id. at 416. 
232. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 468 (1897). 
233. Patrick J. Kelley, Holmes's Early Constitutional Law Theory and Its Applica­
tion in,Takings Cases on the Massachuseus Supreme Judicial Court,J18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
357, 375-81 (1994) (discussing Rideout v. Knox, 19 N.E. 390 (Mass. 1889); Miller v. 
Horton, 26 N.E. 100 (1891); Bent v. Emery, 53 N.E. 910 (1899». 
234. STRUM, supra note 120, at 16. 
235. BASKERVILLE, supra note 114, at 135. 
1995] THE WATUPPA PONDS CASES 73 

Ponds cases, Brandeis was still heavily influenced by his education 
in the common iaw and !pat he was convinced that those cOQ,cepts 
would continue to hold their primary position in American jurispru­
dence, despite growing evidence to the contrary after the Civil 
War.236 Brandeis' view of the pond controversy could be explained 
as exemplifying his belief that judicial evaluations of the common 
law were preferable .to statutes, given the susceptibility of legisla­
tors to special interests.237 .. 
His ideas gradually evolved into what Philippa Strum called an 
"egalitarian economic definition of democracy," which the justice 
had adopted by 1913 and would retain.238 Brandeis wrote, "rights 
of property and the liberty of the individual must be remoulded, 
from time to time, to meet the changing needs of society."239 A 
year later, dissenting'in Mahon, he wrote that an exercise of the 
police power that deprived an owner of the use of his property still 
provided that owner with "the advantage of living and doing busi­
ness in a civilized community."~40 It is thus logical to hypothesize 
that he would have agreed with the majority opinion in Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v .. DeBenedictis, despite his early distrust of 
legislatures.241 
. I believe that Keystone was incorrectly decided because of its 
tendency to undermine principles necessary to a stable society. As 
William O. Douglas wrote: 
The law is not properly susceptible to whim. or caprice. It must 
have the sturdy qualities required of every framework that is 
designed for substantial structures. Moreover, it must have uni­
formity when applied to the daily affairs of men. 
Uniformity and continuity in law are necessary to many ac­
tivities. If they are not present, the integrity of contracts, wills, 
conveyances and securities is impaired. And there will be no 
equal justice under law ifa negligence rule is applied in the 
morning but not in the aftemoon.242 
I do not deny the usefulness of regulatory statutes to environ­
mental interests. However, it is important to note the potential for 
abuse that Keystone created. While the statute at issue in that case 
236. [d. at 78-79. 
237. [d. at 99-100, 112. See supra part N on the Watuppa Nuisance. 
238. STRUM, supra note 120, at 12, 20-23. 
239. 1h1ax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 376 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
240. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922). 
241. 480 U.S. 470 (1987). See supra text accompanying notes 14-23. 
242. William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 CoLUM. L. REV. 735, 735-36 (1949). 
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was no doubt enacted to benefit the public,243'Keystone gave legis­
latures the idea that many exercises of the police power would not 
result in compensable takings.244 The case made it easier for states 
to enact laws and regulations that are not justified and that inter­
rupt private expectations unfairly. 
Perhaps the course of legal reasoning in the nineteenth century 
conceals a lesson for the twentieth. A return to settled principles of 
law, such as the respect for property that recurred at the end of the 
last century, might be in order.245 Arguably, such respect was sub­
rogated to the public enthusiasm for environmental regulation that 
began in the 1960s, just as it was subrogated to the desire for eco­
nomic expansion and industrial development in the early nine­
teenth century. 
While regulation is nec~ssary in a crowded and complex world, 
government is simply not constitutionally authorized to regulate 
away the value of property any more than it can appropriate or 
invade it, without good public reason and just compensation. As 
Justice Rehnquist stated in Keystone, in language reminiscent of 
Justice Holmes in Mahon,246 a broad exception to the just compen­
sation requirement of the Fifth Amendment based ~pon the police 
power ."would surely allow government much greater authority 
than we have recognized to impose societal burdens on individual 
landowners, for nearly every action the government takes is in­
tended to secure for the public an extra measure of 'health, safety, 
and welfare. "'247 
. The Supreme Court has not provided the guidance expected of 
it in this problematic area for some time. In Keystone, four justices 
dissented.248 In Nollan, five justices joined a total of three dis­
sents.249 In First English, the most cohesive of these decisions, one 
243. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492. 
244. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895,901 (S. C. 1991) 
rev'd 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). 
245. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901-02 (1992) 
("[Als it would be required to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a common-law action 
for public nuisance, South Carolina must identify background principles of nuisance 
and property law that prohibit the uses he now intends ...."). . 
246. See supra text accompanying note 230. 
247. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 512-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
248. Id. at 506 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Powell, O'Connor, and 
Scalia, JJ.). . 
249. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 842 (1987) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.); id. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 866 (Ste­
vens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.). 
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dissent was joined in part by two other justices.250 In Lucas, one 
justice concurred,251 two dissented separately,252 and one filed a 
separate statement asserting that the writ of certiorari should have 
been dismissed in the first place.253 By returning to stabilizing prin­
ciples such as those illustrated by the Watuppa Ponds cases, the 
Court could clarify its ambiguous message in takings jurispn~dence. 
. 250. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 
U.S. 304, 322 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined in Parts I and III by Blackmun and 
O'Connor, 11.). 
251. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2902 (1992) (Ken­
nedy, J., concurring). 
252. [d. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); and. id. at 2917 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
253. [d. at 2925 (Souter, J., filing a separate statement). 
